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Abstract 
 
The energy system in Spain can be characterized as being high energy intensive when compared 
to the rest of Europe and because of its high dependence on imported resources (around 84%). 
The focus of this document is to explore a novel approach to describe, as part of this energy 
system, the electricity system in Spain since 2005 and the economic potential for renewable 
energy technologies (RET) to replace the electricity generated from fossil resources by 2050. 
The heart of the design and implementation of any RET policy should be the reduction or 
elimination of fossil fuel dependency. 
 
This document aims at describing the evolution of the Spanish electricity system in the last 
decade, and addressing the possible influence of certain factors in the design and implementation 
of the electricity system by using modern modeling technologies to evaluate the potential of 
RET. This will represent a novel approach to bridge the results from modeling technologies to 
policy makers. To ensure the credibility and reliability of the data researched, validation criteria 
has been used which includes the accuracy of information, the content (whether factual or 
opinion), time (limited to certain periods), format (validity of internet sources, journals, etc), 
authority (reputable authors and sources), objective reasoning, currency and links to other 
resources, and the quality of writings and its review among others. 
 
The proposed research approach follows a methodology where the first step is to understand the 
electricity system in Spain, followed by the definition of the model of interest (optimization 
models) and the design of three different scenarios (Business as Usual, FIT and High fossil 
prices) for the evaluation of the potential of RET, finishing with the analysis of the results from 
the model and data collected from the perspectives of what has been done in previous RET 
policies and plans, and the possible influence of factors such as organizations and corporations 
on those policies and plans.  
 
The results obtained from the model are analysed and compared to the Business as Usual 
scenario. The amount of electricity generated from fossil resources and to be replaced by RET is 
calculated using the scenarios, as well as the evolution of primary energy, imports, final energy 
consumptions and CO2 emissions. 
 
In order to test the applicability of this approach, the results of the model have been compared 
with the current situation of the Spanish electricity system. Calculations using capacity factors of 
the RET and their share in the current electricity generation are performed in order to identify the 
final amount of power (MW) to be installed in order to replace the electricity generated (GWh) 
by fossil resources by 2050. Based on the conclusions, RET has the potential to replace the 
generation of electricity from fossil fuels but improvements in the efficiency of RET will be 
needed. In addition, it is recommended that significant considerations in RET policy like the 
energy and electricity systems should be a strategic component of the Spanish policy system, be 
done in order to set the Spanish electricity system in a more sustainable path.  
iv 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my supervisors Professor Jatin 
Nathwani and Professor David Fuller, who have been tremendous mentors for me. I would like 
to thank you for encouraging my research and for allowing me to grow as a research scientist. 
Your support and guidance have been incredible and without your extensive expertise, 
knowledge and kindness, this document would not have been possible. 
 
I would also like to thank my readers Professor Ian Rowlands and Associate Professor Monica 
Emelko for serving as readers and for your brilliant comments, suggestions and valuable 
feedback. 
 
I would especially like to thank Dr. Helena Cabal and Dr. Maryse Labriet for their academic and 
continued support and assistance over this past year. 
 
A special thanks to my family. Words cannot express how grateful I am to my wonderful wife 
and children, Grace, Gabriel and David, for their love and inspiration and for all of the sacrifices 
that you have made on my behalf. 
 
At the end I would like to express appreciation to my beloved wife Grace who I spent sleepless 
nights with and was always my support in the moments when there was no one to answer my 
queries. I love you and admire you, and you gave me the courage and strength needed to 
continue with this. Without your support, this document would not have been possible. I dedicate 
this document to you. 
 
 
  
v 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. x 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... xii 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
2. RET in Spain ........................................................................................................................... 6 
2.1. RET plans and RET in Spain ........................................................................................... 6 
2.2. Renewable policies in Spain ............................................................................................ 7 
2.3. CO2 emissions and contribution of RET ....................................................................... 11 
3. Framework of the PER.......................................................................................................... 13 
3.1. Regulatory overview ...................................................................................................... 13 
3.2. Targets of the PER ......................................................................................................... 14 
3.3. Financing ........................................................................................................................ 17 
3.4. Policy tools ..................................................................................................................... 19 
3.5. Results of the PER.......................................................................................................... 21 
3.5.1. Main results ............................................................................................................. 21 
3.5.2. Achievements of the RET ....................................................................................... 25 
3.5.3. Investments of the RET .......................................................................................... 27 
3.5.4. Premiums of the RET.............................................................................................. 28 
4. A review of the Spanish electricity system ........................................................................... 30 
4.1. Possible factors influencing electricity plans ................................................................. 30 
4.1.1. Influence from corporations .................................................................................... 30 
4.1.2. Evolution of regulations and its relationship to corporations ................................. 36 
4.1.3. The “revolving doors” effect .................................................................................. 41 
4.1.4. Considerations of influences ................................................................................... 44 
4.2. Current situation of the Spanish electricity system ........................................................ 47 
5. Application of the TIMES-IB model to the Spanish energy system .................................... 66 
5.1. The Times model generator............................................................................................ 67 
5.2. The Times-IB model ...................................................................................................... 73 
5.3. Scenarios ........................................................................................................................ 76 
vi 
6. Results ................................................................................................................................... 81 
6.1. Primary energy ............................................................................................................... 81 
6.2. Final energy consumption .............................................................................................. 84 
6.3. Primary energy-Imports ................................................................................................. 85 
6.4. Electricity generation ..................................................................................................... 86 
6.5. Electricity generation-fossil resources ........................................................................... 88 
6.6. CO2 emissions................................................................................................................ 89 
6.7. Summary ........................................................................................................................ 90 
7. Analysis................................................................................................................................. 93 
7.1. Analysis of the PER ....................................................................................................... 93 
7.2. Understanding the Spanish electricity system .............................................................. 100 
8. Conclusions and recommendations..................................................................................... 111 
8.1. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 111 
8.2. Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 115 
9. Further work........................................................................................................................ 119 
References ................................................................................................................................... 120 
Appendix A – Shell interface ...................................................................................................... 130 
Appendix B – Primary energy additional graphs ........................................................................ 141 
Appendix C – Primary energy imports additional graphs .......................................................... 144 
Appendix D – Electricity generation additional graphs .............................................................. 147 
Appendix E – Electricity generation from fossil additional graphs ............................................ 150 
Appendix F -  CO2 emissions additional graphs ........................................................................ 152 
Appendix G -  VEDA training course agenda ............................................................................ 154 
Appendix H -  VEDA training course certificate ........................................................................ 156 
Appendix I – Wind data .............................................................................................................. 157 
 
  
vii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Evolution of political decisions related to RET in the last 13 years ............................... 3 
Figure 3.1. Expected RET supply mix by 2010 ............................................................................ 16 
Figure 3.2. Primary energy consumption mix in 2005 and 2010 (March 2011) .......................... 22 
Figure 3.3. Evolution of biofuels over gasoline and diesel........................................................... 24 
Figure 3.4. Premium to RET during the PER ............................................................................... 28 
Figure 4.1. Iberdrola’s electricity generation in Spain (2012) ...................................................... 33 
Figure 4.2. Evolution of political decisions related to RET in the last 13 years .......................... 37 
Figure 4.3. Evolution of regulations 2000-2010 ........................................................................... 37 
Figure 4.4. Primary energy in Spain (2011) ................................................................................. 48 
Figure 4.5. Composition of renewable energies in primary energy (2011) .................................. 49 
Figure 4.6. Evolution of electricity generation in Spain (2013) ................................................... 51 
Figure 4.7. Evolution of electricity generation from conventional technologies in Spain (2013) 52 
Figure 4.8. Comparison of electricity generated in Spain (2013) ................................................. 53 
Figure 4.9. Evolution of electricity generation from RET technologies in Spain (2013) ............. 54 
Figure 4.10. Annual demand coverage of electricity demand (2012) ........................................... 57 
Figure 4.11. Coverage of peninsular maximum hourly demand - 13 February 2012 (9:00 pm -
10:00 pm) (2012) .......................................................................................................................... 58 
Figure 4.12. European electricity prices for residential consumers (2013) .................................. 60 
Figure 4.13. Electricity bill composition in Spain ........................................................................ 61 
Figure 4.14. Evolution of CO2 emission in Spain ........................................................................ 62 
Figure 4.15. Evolution of CO2 emission from energy processes in Spain compared to total 
emissions ....................................................................................................................................... 63 
Figure 5.1. Overview of an energy system model ........................................................................ 67 
Figure 5.2. Illustration for market equilibrium. ............................................................................ 70 
Figure 5.3. Simplified TIMES objective function ........................................................................ 72 
Figure 5.4. Total annual cost simplified equation......................................................................... 72 
Figure 5.5. Origins of Times-IB. .................................................................................................. 73 
Figure 5.6. Single region reference energy system. ...................................................................... 74 
Figure 5.7. Model requirements. ................................................................................................... 75 
viii 
Figure 5.8. FIT values in the model. ............................................................................................. 79 
Figure 6.1 Primary energy consumption in the three scenarios. ................................................... 81 
Figure 6.2. Final energy consumption in the three scenarios. ...................................................... 84 
Figure 6.3. Comparison of primary energy import results per scenario in 2050 (PJ)................... 85 
Figure 6.4. Comparison of electricity generation results per scenario in 2050 (GWh) ................ 86 
Figure 6.5. Comparison of electricity generation from fossil resources results in 2050 (GWh) .. 88 
Figure 6.6. Comparison of CO2 emissions before CCS results per scenario in 2050 (MtCO2) .. 90 
Figure 7.1. Expected and real installed capacity of the PER. ....................................................... 95 
Figure 7.2. Maximum hourly and daily demands in Spain. ........................................................ 100 
Figure 7.3. Supply and demand aggregated curves. ................................................................... 101 
Figure 7.4. Evolution of the tariff deficit in Spain (2013). ......................................................... 104 
Figure B.1 Evolution of primary energy – BaU ......................................................................... 141 
Figure B.2. Evolution of primary energy – FIT .......................................................................... 141 
Figure B.3. Evolution of primary energy – HFOSPRI ............................................................... 142 
Figure B.4. Primary energy share by 2050 – BaU ...................................................................... 142 
Figure B.5. Primary energy share by 2050 – FIT ....................................................................... 143 
Figure B.6. Primary energy share by 2050 – HFOSPRI ............................................................. 143 
Figure C.1. Evolution of imports on primary energy – BaU ...................................................... 144 
Figure C.2. Evolution of imports on primary energy – FIT........................................................ 144 
Figure C.3. Evolution of imports on primary energy – HFOSPRI ............................................. 145 
Figure C.4. Imports share on primary energy by 2050 – BaU .................................................... 145 
Figure C.5. Imports share on primary energy by 2050 – FIT ..................................................... 146 
Figure C.6. Imports share on primary energy by 2050 – HFOSPRI........................................... 146 
Figure D.1. Evolution of electricity generation – BaU ............................................................... 147 
Figure D.2. Evolution of electricity generation – FIT ................................................................ 147 
Figure D.3. Evolution of electricity generation – HFOSPRI ...................................................... 148 
Figure D.4. Electricity generation share by 2050 – BaU ............................................................ 148 
Figure D.5. Electricity generation share by 2050 – FIT ............................................................. 149 
Figure D.6. Electricity generation share by 2050 – HFOSPRI ................................................... 149 
Figure E.1. Evolution of electricity generation from fossil resources – BaU ............................. 150 
Figure E.2. Evolution of electricity generation from fossil resources – FIT .............................. 150 
ix 
Figure E.3. Evolution of electricity generation from fossil resources – HFOSPRI .................... 151 
Figure F.1. Evolution of CO2 emissions before CCS – BaU ..................................................... 152 
Figure F.2. Evolution of CO2 emissions before CCS – FIT ....................................................... 152 
Figure F.3. Evolution of CO2 emissions before CCS – HFOSPRI ............................................ 153 
  
x 
List of Tables 
Table 3.1. Targets of the PER for 2010 (2010)............................................................................. 14 
Table 3.2. Situation in 2005 and targets of the PER for 2010 – Generation in primary energy 
terms .............................................................................................................................................. 15 
Table 3.3. Situation in 2005 and targets for 2010 according to PER – Installed capacity ........... 16 
Table 3.4. Situation in 2005 and targets for 2010 according to PER – Generation ...................... 17 
Table 3.5. Financial analysis of the PER ...................................................................................... 17 
Table 3.6. Public financial support to the PER ............................................................................. 18 
Table 3.7. Endowment of the PER................................................................................................ 18 
Table 3.8. PER budget and AACC contribution ........................................................................... 19 
Table 3.9. Financial analysis of the PER (thousands of euros) .................................................... 20 
Table 3.10. Premiums of the PER (2005) ..................................................................................... 21 
Table 3.11. Primary energy consumption in 2005 and 2010 (March 2011) ................................. 22 
Table 3.12. Generation and gross consumption of electricity in Spain, 2005-2010 ..................... 23 
Table 3.13. REE’s 2010 Electrical Power Balance....................................................................... 24 
Table 3.14. Real installed capacity and degree of achievement of the PER (March 2011) .......... 25 
Table 3.15. Real electricity generated and degree of achievement of the PER (March 2011) ..... 26 
Table 3.16. Final electricity generated after the PER (March 2011) ............................................ 27 
Table 3.17. Forecasted and real investment of the PER (March 2011) ........................................ 28 
Table 4.1. Installed capacity per corporation (2008) .................................................................... 31 
Table 4.2. Connections of politicians and electricity generators (2013) ...................................... 43 
Table 4.3. Level of dependency of external sources (2011) ......................................................... 49 
Table 4.4. National Electricity Balance (2013) ............................................................................ 51 
Table 4.5. Installed capacity in Spain (2012) ............................................................................... 55 
Table 4.6. Evolution of capacity factors in Spain (2013) ............................................................. 56 
Table 4.7. Levelized cost in Spain (2013) .................................................................................... 56 
Table 4.8. Evolution of premiums toRES in Spain (2013) ........................................................... 59 
Table 6. Color coding for main technologies. ............................................................................... 81 
Table 6.1. Share of primary energy per scenario in 2050 ............................................................. 82 
Table 6.2. Share of primary energy imports per scenario in 2050 ................................................ 85 
xi 
Table 6.3. Share of electricity generation per scenario in 2050 .................................................... 87 
Table 6.4. Share of electricity generation from fossil resources per scenario in 2050 ................. 88 
Table 7.1. CO2 emissions from the Spanish electricity sector ................................................... 109 
Table 7.2. Values for the Spanish electricity and energy systems (2012-2013) ......................... 110 
  
  
xii 
List of Abbreviations 
AACC Autonomous Communities 
BP British Petroleum 
CNE Comisión Nacional de la Energía (National Energy Commision) 
CPI Consumer´s Price Index 
EE Energy Efficiency 
EEA European Economic Area  
EU European Union 
FIT Feed-In-Tariff 
IDAE Institute for the diversification and the energy saving 
IEA International Energy Agency 
MITYC Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce 
MIEYT Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism 
MMA Ministry of Environment  
MtCO2 Millions of tons of CO2 
PER Spanish renewable energy plan 2005-2010 
PFER Spanish renewable energy plan 2000-2010 
PP Popular party (Political party) 
PSOE Socialist party (Political party) 
REE Red eléctrica de España 
RET/RET Renewable energy sources/Renewable energy technologies 
TIMES The Integrated MARKAL–EFOM System 
TIMES-IB TIMES Iberia (Spain + Portugal) 
TNCs Transnational corporations 
1 
1. Introduction 
The Spanish energy system has been characterized by higher energy intensity than the rest of 
Europe, by a high dependence on energy imports (around 84%) and also by rapid changes of the 
energy system in the last few years (IDAE 2005) (MIEYT 2011). The Spanish renewable energy 
plan 2005-2010 (Plan de Energías Renovables - PER) represented a revision of the Spanish 
promotion plan for renewable energy 2000-2010 (PFER) in force up until 2005. As stated in the 
PER, this revision happened because the initial forecast of absolute growth of renewable energies 
(RET) set up in the PFER were not met, energy consumption was growing continuously and over 
forecasted, and there was a need to comply with new international environmental commitments 
set by the Government of Spain (GOS) in terms of climate change and sustainable development. 
 
The PER set three main targets and only one was fulfilled (and not to its full extent). When it 
comes to plans of this kind, it does not matter how ambitious the targets can be and how 
successful policy tools are, if it is continually lacking on considering fundamental and structural 
changes to the system. For instance, and based on further reviews in this document of the 
evaluations carried out by the Evaluation´s State Agency of public policies and the quality of 
services of the PER, the creation of a central unit for the Spain’s energy strategy and a real 
cooperation between the GOS and the Autonomous communities (AACC) should have been at 
the core of the PER. In addition, it was detected that the AACC had too much power and 
influence during the last decade and it made them key players in any policy deployment. These 
influences, in addition to the transferred powers and competences associated to RET policies and 
politicians, should have been revised during the deployment of the PER (AEVAL 2011). 
 
The economic crisis is still hitting many European countries and Spain is struggling to cope with 
factors that are damaging its economy (a high unemployment rate of more than 25% by 
3Q/2013). In addition, the Spanish energy system appears to be unsustainable as there is a high 
dependence of imported resources; the Spanish energy system generates high CO2 emissions; 
and there is high uncertainty of nuclear policy in the future (Cabal and Lechon 2011). 
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In particular, in 2010, around 80% of the total primary energy was from fossil resources and 77% 
of the total primary energy was imported (MITYC 2010). Also, up to 2007 CO2 emissions’ trend 
was upward, well above the agreed target in the Kyoto Protocol (protocol approved by the EU 
through the Decision 2002/358/EC), and exceeding 51% from base year levels. Unfortunately the 
trend has gone upward again and Spain will have to buy carbon credits from other EU countries1 
in order to not exceed the 15% increase in emissions from the year base (1990) during the period 
2008-2012 (Kyoto commitment). Finally, there will be a withdrawal from nuclear energy 
(fission) in 2028 in Spain with the decommissioning of the last nuclear facility, and due to the 
Fukushima accident, the society is questioning this type of energy again. 
 
This situation implies the need to review the Spanish energy and electricity systems through 
possible changes in demand and supply. The following concepts should be taken into account: 
a) the dependency of external sources (imports) for primary energy; 
b) the scarcity of fossil resources; 
c) the uncertainties over the nuclear future, and 
d) the potential of renewable energy and the maturity of some of these technologies. 
 
In order to look at these issues in a comprehensive approach, the following research questions 
will be investigated: 
 
- Is there an economic potential for RET to replace electricity generated from fossil 
resources by looking at the current situation of the electricity system? 
- Is there potential to reduce CO2 emissions by using RET in Spain? 
 
This document will aim at contributing to the description of the evolution of the Spanish 
electricity system in the last decade, to address the possible influence of various factors (i.e. 
corporations and organizations) in the design and implementation of electricity systems and the 
use of modern modeling technologies to evaluate the performance of energy and electricity 
systems. All together, they will represent a novel approach to bridge the results from modeling 
technologies to policy makers. 
                                                 
1
 http://www.energias-renovables.com/articulo/espana-sigue-gastando-millones-de-euros-por-20121023/ 
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This novel approach follows a methodology where the first step is to understand the electricity 
market of the jurisdiction of analysis (in this case Spain), and to ensure the availability and 
credibility of the data to be used. It is followed by the definition of the model of interest and the 
design of the scenarios, and finalizing with the analysis of both results from the model and data 
collected from the perspectives of what has been done in previous RET policies and plans, and 
the possible influence of external factors in those policies and plans. 
 
It was also found that the best way to clearly understand such a complex area of analysis, which 
is energy and electricity models and its implications, was on a timeframe approach, where, 
starting in the year 2000, the storyline could be told following the path up to 2050. Figure 1 
shows the timeframe related to the first 13 years (2000-2013) including the most important 
political decisions related to RET. The remainder of the period of analysis, up to 2050, will be 
covered by the preliminary results from the model of interest. 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of political decisions related to RET in the last 13 years 
  
Previous studies of electricity markets using modelling techniques have been done extensively. 
Fuller (2008) described market equilibrium models with continuous and binary variables, where 
binary variables were introduced into nonintegrable models (not based in social welfare 
maximization). In a different approach, Linares et al. (2008) used an oligopolistic, long-term 
generation expansion model to design three scenarios to analyze whether current policies could 
be able to achieve sustainability by themselves. 
 
San Cristobal (2012) used a goal programming model for environmental policy analysis with an 
application for Spain, and Burgos-Payan et al. (2013) discussed the case of the effects of the 
integration of RET in Spain by empirically reviewing Spanish RET support schemes and the 
2000 2005 2005 2010 2011 Jan2012 March2012 Sept2012 Jan2013 Feb2013 July2013
A B C D E FINAL
PER 
2011-
2020PFER 2000-2010 PER 2005-2010
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balance between the cost increase for the system and the reduction in wholesale prices, while 
including the effect of the cost of CO2 allowances needed to cover the greenhouse emissions, as 
given in Sensfuss et al. (2008) and Saenz de Miera et al. (2008). 
 
Labriet et al. (2010) used an analysis to evaluate the energy strategies to be implemented in 
Spain in order to satisfy the EU Renewable Directive. The modelling framework of this work 
relied on the techno-economic model TIMES-Spain, part of the Pan-European TIMES model, 
and is used to discuss the dynamics of the RET implementation in Spain, given the European 
targets as well as the national targets and context. The model of interest used in this document 
follows this approach and utilizes and modifies the existing model of the TIMES-IB (IB stands 
for Iberia: Spain and Portugal). The TIMES-IB model is a techno-economic model of the 
Spanish and Portuguese energy systems which resulted from the interaction and participation of 
various European projects. This model was selected as it best represents the Spanish energy 
system and is a reputable source for modelling technologies. 
 
This document represents a summary of the RET and RET plans in Spain, as well as the PER 
and its results. It provides a review of the evaluation carried out by the evaluation and quality 
agency of the Government of Spain, and it analyzes the results focusing on the electricity 
generation from RET. The document also provides current available information for installed 
power and generation from both RET and conventional sources in Spain, as well as the current 
premiums for the generation of electricity from RET, the capacity factors and levelized costs for 
selected generating technologies in Spain, and the peninsular instantaneous peak power demand 
(in MW) for the current time and for the period of the PER. 
 
This information will be supported by the analysis of the results from the identified model which 
considers three possible scenarios: a Business as Usual scenario, which includes the suspension 
of Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) incentives in Spain since January 2012, a FIT scenario, which maintains 
the FIT incentives, and a high fossil fuel scenario, where prices for imported fossil fuels have 
been increased in 10% to see the response of the system such increase. These three scenarios 
have been defined under these concepts because they represent the most real situation of the 
energy and electricity systems (Business as Usual scenario); they consider the hypothesis of 
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continuing with the FIT incentives (FIT scenario); and analyses the reaction of the systems under 
an increase of imported resources (high fossil fuel scenario). The scenarios will be analysed in 
order to reflect the anticipated situation in 2050. The document will also provide comprehensive 
conclusions and recommendations that might help understand the complexity of implementing 
these types of plans and its consequences. 
 
The document is structured as follows. Chapter 2 briefly describes the renewable energy context 
in Spain including renewable energy plans and renewable energy policies in Spain, CO2 
emissions and the contribution of RET to mitigate them. Chapter 3 briefly describes the 
framework of the PER and its main targets, it presents the results, including the achievements of 
the RET, the investment in RET and the premiums to RET. Chapter 4 reviews the Spanish 
electricity system focusing on possible external factors that might influence RET plans, as well 
as providing current data available in the Spanish energy and electricity sectors. Chapter 5 
introduces the modelling framework used for the analysis (TIMES-IB) and the defined scenarios. 
Chapter 6 presents the most important results obtained for the different designed scenarios, and 
chapter 7 analyzes the PER results and the current data available in the Spanish electricity sector. 
Finally, conclusions and recommendations are provided in chapter 8. 
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2. RET in Spain 
This chapter further elaborates the renewable energy context in Spain, taking into consideration 
the RET plans and RET in Spain. It provides a brief review of the renewable energy policies over 
the last 15 years and the evolution of CO2 emissions with considerations for the contribution of 
RET to mitigate them. 
  
2.1. RET plans and RET in Spain 
A cost-effective reduction in CO2 emissions should require both the implementation of effective 
Energy Efficiency (EE) technologies and practices, and also give priority to low carbon 
technologies in the energy mix including RET. In this context, most governments adopted 
measures aimed at overcoming economic, technical and nontechnical barriers to deploy RET. 
The specific objectives and the support mechanisms employed have varied from country to 
country, reflecting specific interests, economic context, market and industrial situation, 
technology potential, and also the idiosyncrasies of each culture. The degree of success of these 
measures has also been variable, both in terms of cost and deployment effectiveness (Lewis and 
Wiser 2007) (Komor and Bazilian 2005). Spain has often been cited as an example for its 
success in the rapid deployment of alternative energy technologies, particularly wind, 
concentrated solar thermo electric, and photovoltaic (PV) (Martinez et al. 2009). However, there 
have been serious concerns about the rising costs of RET support in a country that has been 
badly hit by a financial crisis. 
 
For the last two decades, Spain has undergone a rapid economic expansion accompanied by a 
similarly fast growth in energy consumption. Between 1990 and 2005, Spain’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew by 49.1% and its primary energy use by 61.3%, compared to 12.0% and 
15.1% in the EU, respectively (IEA 2008).  Despite the lack of fossil fuel resources in its 
national territory, the Spanish energy model is highly centralized and is dependent on 
conventional technologies. As a reference, of the 142 070 ktoe of primary energy used in 2008, 
47.6% came from oil-derived products, 24.3% natural gas, 10.7% nuclear power, 9.7% coal, and 
7.6% renewable energies. Imports accounted for 68.6% of the coal, 99.8% of the oil, and 99.9% 
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of the natural gas consumed (MITYC 2009). In addition, prior to the development of incentive 
programs, the use of RET in Spain was limited to small-scale biomass combustion installations 
for heat generation and small hydropower plants. 
 
Several studies analyzed the future of RET in Spain. Linares et al. (2008) described different 
scenarios with estimations for 2020 that ranged from 16% (nonintervention) to 53% (ambitious 
RET policies including large hydropower investments). Resch et at. (2008) calculated that RET 
contribution in Spain would need to reach 40% of electricity (mostly from wind, large-scale 
hydropower, and biomass) and 21% of heat in order to comply cost effectively with 2020 EU 
objectives. The Spanish government approved the “Planning of the Electricity and Gas sectors 
2008–2016,” which included a national indicative target for RET generation of 32% in 2016 
(129,472 GWh). 
 
2.2. Renewable policies in Spain 
The Spanish policy on the promotion of RET needs to be analyzed within an international 
context. On one hand, the European Union sets the common ground in the form of directives 
which are subsequently transposed and developed into national legislation while, on the other 
hand, international commitments on CO2 emissions (like the Kyoto Protocol) became legally 
binding to EU Member States following ratification in 2002. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol allowed Spain a 15% increase in CO2 emissions above the 1990 values for 
the reference period 2008–2012. This allocation has been exceeded due to a larger than expected 
economic expansion in that period. GHG emissions peaked in 2005 (52.9% above 1990 values) 
and were subsequently reduced to 42.7% in 2008 due to low economic activity levels as a result 
of the economic crisis (more information about CO2 emissions in Spain will be provided in 
following chapters). 
 
Other international and European contexts affecting the Spanish policy were: 
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• The most recent RET Directive (Directive 28/2009/EC on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources) which set the regulatory framework and a target for 
renewable energies in Europe (20% RET in the final energy consumption, including 
electricity, heat, and transport sectors combined). 
• The European Climate Change and Energy Package (2008) (also referred to as 20/20/20 
by 2020) included three binding targets for the EU to be achieved by 2020: To reduce 
emissions of GHG emissions by 20% by 2020 (with respect to 1990), to increase energy 
efficiency to save 20% of EU energy consumption by 2020, to reach 20% of renewable 
energy in the total energy consumption in the EU by 2020, and to reach 10% of biofuels 
in the total consumption of vehicles by 2020. 
• The Biomass Action Plan (2005) sets out a strategy aimed at doubling the use of biomass 
for energy purposes in the EU from 69,000 ktoe in 2004 to around 150,000 ktoe in 2010. 
• Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy 
products and electricity allowed Member States to apply low (or even zero) fuel tax rates 
for biofuels. 
• The Biofuels Directive (Directive 2003/30/CE on the promotion of biofuels for transport) 
set non-legally binding targets on the share of biofuels on transport fuels (2% in 2005 and 
5.75% in 2010). 
• The RET Directive (Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market) sets specific targets for RET-
E generation in Member States and included several technical and administrative 
measures intended to achieve an overall objective of 21% by 2010. 
 
Spain has been one of the most successful countries in the public promotion of RET, particularly 
wind electricity (Del Rio 2008). This support has been regulated through a feed-in tariff (FIT) 
scheme (FITs are subsidies per unit of energy (kWh) generated paid in the form of a total 
quantity (tariff) or as an amount on top of the wholesale electricity price (premium) fed into the 
grid and combined with a purchase obligation by the utilities). This instrument is also used in 
most other EU countries with different degrees of success both in terms of effectiveness and cost 
(Del Rio 2008) (Linares et al. 2008). 
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The success of RET support policies does not depend only on the type of support scheme being 
implemented, but is significantly affected by the design elements of those instruments. The basic 
structure of the Spanish FIT system was first implemented in 1998 but has been subsequently 
modified in 2004 and 2007 (2008 for solar PV). Despite the legislative changes, there has been 
continuity and stability in the RET promotion framework under different governments (Del Rio 
2009). The main regulations regarding RET promotion in Spain according to San Miguel et. al 
(2010) were: 
 
Law of the Electricity Sector (Law 54/97): this law established a “Special Regime” in which 
RET was given a special treatment with the aim of achieving the EU target of 12% of the gross 
energy consumption from RET in 2010. The basic framework for RET support was provided by 
this law, which included guaranteed grid access and a price support for RET producers. In 
addition, RET plants lower than 10 MW would receive a premium set by the government. 
 
Royal Decree on the Special Regime (RD 2818/1998): this Royal Decree developed the support 
system for RET producers, who could choose between two alternatives: (1) A fixed premium on 
top of the electricity market price and (2) a fixed total price (fixed feed-in). These values were 
adjusted annually, which allowed generators to know their revenue in advance regardless of 
changes in the market price. The cost of implementing this scheme is finally paid by consumers 
through their electricity bill. 
 
Royal Decree 436/2004: RET generators were allowed to sell their electricity to distributors or 
directly to the market. In both cases, support was defined for each renewable technology as a 
percentage of the average electricity tariff (AET). The rapid increase in the AET that took place 
in that period led to an excessive increase in the costs of RET support. This led to the approval of 
another Royal Decree. 
 
Royal Decree 661/2007: this Royal Decree provided the current RET regulatory framework in 
Spain. RET support was tied to the evolution of the consumer price index (CPI). In addition, a 
cap-and-floor system for RET support levels was implemented. If the market price plus the 
premium are above the cap value, then RET generators only receive the cap level. If they are 
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below the floor values, they receive the floor price. The goal was to avoid excessive costs for 
consumers (cap), while simultaneously encouraging investments (floor). 
 
However, back in 2008 there were already concerns about the rising costs of the system, an 
inherent problem of effective FIT schemes. Although the unitary support (eurocents/kWh) was 
capped, a relatively high FIT made RET investments very attractive, which lead to a high 
increase in the total support. Official data from the National Energy Commission (2008) showed 
that the total amount of RET support increased more than threefold from 1,740 million euros in 
2004 to 5,702 million euros in 2008. Particularly problematic was the rise in the total support 
between 2007 and 2008 (from 3,369 million euros to 5,702 million euros, a 69% rise). Although 
total support increased for all technologies, the greatest growth in relative terms was experienced 
by Solar PV (fivefold increase) and in absolute terms by wind (it added €1,100 million to the 
support received in 2007). The fact that the total installed Solar PV electricity capacity in Spain 
in 2008 was 3,210 MW, when its target for 2010 was only 400 MW, suggests that the FIT was 
set at a very high level. 
 
In order to deal with FIT increases, the Spanish government put a cap on the price and on the 
quantity (RET deployment), leading to a high increase in the total support. This was done first in 
the solar PV realm. 
 
In September 2008, the Spanish government approved the Royal Decree 1578/2008, which set 
not only a cap price on this technology but also a quantity cap (through the requirement for a 
preregistration). This was done in order to keep the overall support costs at reasonable levels. For 
the other RET, there was an attempt to limit the overall costs of the system by requiring 
renewable energy projects to pre-register, limiting the right to receive the FIT to those already 
preregistered before June 7, 2009 (Royal Decree-Law 6/2009). The aim of this preregistration 
was, according to the government, to encourage a “sustained growth” for the different 
technologies in order to avoid technical problems and excessive costs (Hernandez 2009). 
 
11 
2.3. CO2 emissions and contribution of RET 
Spanish CO2 emissions in 2008 were 42.7% above base-year levels (1990), which compares 
poorly against the Kyoto target of 15% in 2008–2012. Energy and transport sectors were the 
main contributors to the CO2 emissions. The analysis of the factors behind these emission trends 
is beyond the scope of this document, although there is a relation to the strong economic and 
demographic growth, and the increase in energy demand. 
 
The two main pillars to mitigate emissions are policies aimed at Energy Efficiency (EE) and the 
promotion of RET. Regarding the former, most instruments to promote EE in Spain are the result 
of transposition of EU directives into national law which predominantly fall under the Spanish 
Energy Efficiency Strategy (E4) 2004–2012. The other main pillar of a low carbon economy is 
RET, which contributes to the reduction in CO2 emissions and Kyoto compliance. 
 
A particularly decisive effort should be made in sectors not covered by the EU emissions trading 
scheme (EU-ETS), also called diffuse sectors (mainly transport and residential/commercial), 
where emissions are expected to increase by 65% (MMA 2007). Substitution of conventional 
fuels for RET in electricity generation would facilitate compliance with the EU-ETS by power 
companies. In addition, the implementation of renewables in transport and heat would contribute 
to the control of emissions in the diffuse sectors. However, this will not be enough to reduce 
emissions to the required levels (MMA 2007). 
 
Therefore, recourse to Kyoto units2 were needed to cover emissions both in sectors covered and 
non-covered by the EU-ETS. For covered sectors, private companies (mostly in the electricity 
sector) needed to purchase Kyoto units (1,302 MtCO2 for 2008–2012). In addition, the 
government purchased 159 MtCO2 to cover diffuse emissions, thus promoting the development 
of RET abroad. 
 
The long-term problem is that emissions from diffused sectors are difficult to tackle with 
renewable energy measures and other more decisive instruments have been neglected. In 
                                                 
2
 Emissions trading, as set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows countries that have emission units to spare 
- emissions permitted them but not "used" - to sell this excess capacity to countries that are over their targets.  
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particular, fiscal instruments (taxes) within an ecological tax reform, with corresponding 
reductions in social security contributions by employers have been proposed by economists in 
Spain with little success. Instead, the approach should be a more politically feasible one (but less 
socially desirable), i.e., to subsidize the large emissions increase in the diffuse sectors by buying 
Kyoto units through the public budget. 
Deployment of renewables will reduce CO2 emissions in Spain. The initial plan indicates that 
about 70% of the reduction should be attained in the electricity generation area, followed by 20% 
in biofuels, and 10% in thermal uses. However, there are currently no official calculations on 
how Spain is expected to achieve its 20% renewable energy target in 2020 and the resulting CO2 
emission reductions. Only some prospective studies for the electricity sector can shed light on 
this issue. 
 
The following chapter provides a detailed explanation of the latest RET plan deployed in Spain, 
the PER (2005-2010). 
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3. Framework of the PER 
According to IDAE (2005) Spain has been undergoing rapid growth in energy intensity for the 
last fifteen years. Spain’s excessive and growing dependence on external energy supplies — 
around 83% over the last few years— and the need to preserve the environment, made it 
necessary to promote effective formulas for efficient use of energy and the use of clean sources 
of energy. It was believed that there were enough reasons to promote effective formulas for 
efficient use of energy and the use of clean sources of energy. 
 
3.1. Regulatory overview 
Since 1997 Spain has undergone its own liberalization process, going from a strong 
interventionist policy, almost a monopoly status, to a more open market for generation and 
commercialization (IDAE 2005). Following the European framework, promotion policies for 
renewable energies (RET) have been developed around the liberalized market set up by the Law 
54/1997. In particular, Article 4 of the 54/97 Law for the Electrical Sector, stated that “the 
national electricity planning will be indicative except for those concerning transmission facilities, 
with the participation of the Autonomous communities (AACC)”.3 
 
This “indicative planning” should include: notes to the evolution of market conditions, the 
expectations about the behaviour of the demand and the resources to fulfill it, the need of new 
power, correction of the imbalances between generation and demand, and the criteria for 
environmental protection. In this planning process, AACC should have had special significance 
due to their authority to decide the preferential location of the resources within its own territory, 
although, it could represent an opposition to any national electricity policy. Under this regulatory 
overview, the targets for the PER were set. 
 
                                                 
3
 The State is organized into municipalities, provinces and autonomous  communities (AACC): 17 autonomous 
communities and two cities (Ceuta and Melilla). These AACC are: Andalusia, Aragón, Principality of Asturias, 
Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Catalonia, 
Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid, Region of Murcia, Navarre, and Valencian Community. 
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3.2. Targets of the PER 
The targets set in 2005 expected a contribution from RET (hydro included) of 12.10 % of 
primary energy consumption in 2010, electricity generation from RET of 29.4 % of the gross 
electricity consumption, and biofuels consumption of 5.75 % of gasoline and diesel use for 
transport in 2010 (IDAE 2005). Table 3.1. summarizes the three main targets for 2010. 
 
Target # Targets of the PER 2010 
1 Renewable energies / Primary energy 12.10 % 
2 % of electricity from renewable sources / Gross consumption of electricity 29.4 % 
3 % of biofuels (gasoline and diesel) use for transport 5.75 % 
Table 3.1. Targets of the PER for 2010 (2010) 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, IDAE (2005). 
 
These targets were broken down by the electricity generation technologies considered in the PER 
(see Table 3.2.) and classified into primary energy terms (ktoe) for the first target, and into 
installed power (MW) and generation of electricity (GWh), for the second target. The third target 
was classified as a percentage of biofuels consumption over the consumption of gasoline and 
diesel. 
 
In order to evaluate the achievement of the first target, the PER considered to move from a 6.88 
% of RET of the total consumption of primary energy, to a 12.10 % share of RET’s total 
country’s consumption by 2010. The following table shows the targets for the generation of 
electricity from RET in primary energy terms (ktoe). 
 
Renewable energy source / ktoe 
Output in primary 
energy terms (ktoe) 
2005 2010 
Hydro-electric (>50MW) 1,979 1,979 
Hydro-electric (10-50MW) 498 557 
Hydro-electric (<10MW) 466 575 
Biomass power station 680 3,586 
Biomass Co-combustion 0 1,552 
MSW 395 395 
15 
Wind power 1,683 3,914 
Solar PV 5 52 
Biogas 267 455 
Solar Thermoelectric 0 509 
Biomass Thermal 3,487 4,070 
Low temperature solar Thermal 51 376 
Biofuels 228 2,200 
Total renewable energy source 9,739 20,220 
Consumption of primary energy 141,567 167,100 
% of renewable energy / primary 6.88 % 12.10 % 
Table 3.2. Situation in 2005 and targets of the PER for 2010 – Generation in primary energy terms 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, IDAE (2005). 
 
For the second target, the PER aimed at installing more than 15,400 MW from RET by 2010 
with an increase of more than 17% in wind power. Hydro-electric (>50MW) was planned to stay 
at the same capacity and therefore having a decrease of more than 18% at the expense of other 
RET. Other technologies presented only increments of around 1% (solar PV, biomass power 
stations, etc). Table 3.3. shows, for the installed power, the situation in 2005, the targets set by 
PER for 2010, and the expected increases for this period. In addition, Figure 3.1. shows the 
expected percentages of RET installed capacities by 2010. 
 
Renewable energy source / MW 
Situation 
in 2005 
(MW) 
Target for 
2010 (MW) 
Expected 
increase 2005-
2010 (MW) 
Hydro-electric (>50MW) 13,521 13,521 0 
Hydro-electric (10-50MW) 2,897 3,257 360 
Hydro-electric (<10MW) 1,749 2,199 450 
Biomass 
  
 
Biomass power station 344 1,317 973 
Co-combustion 0 722 722 
MSW 189 189 0 
Wind power 8,155 20,155 12,000 
Solar PV 37 400 363 
Biogas 141 235 94 
Solar Thermoelectric 0 500 500 
Total installed capacity from RET 27,033 42,495 15,462 
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Table 3.3. Situation in 2005 and targets for 2010 according to PER – Installed capacity 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, IDAE (2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Expected RET supply mix by 2010 
Source: Adapted from MIEYT (2011) 
 
The targets of the PER aimed at increasing by more than 42,000 GWh the electricity generation 
from RET, with an important increase coming from wind power, almost 12%, at the expense of 
reduction in generation from hydro-electric. Table 3.4. shows the situation in 2005, the targets 
set in the PER for 2010 for the generation of electricity from RET, and the expected increases for 
this period. 
 
Renewable energy source / GWh 
Situation 
in 2005 
(GWh) 
Target for 
2010 
(GWh) 
Expected 
increase 2005-
2010 (GWh) 
Hydro-electric (>50MW) 25,014 25,014 0 
Hydro-electric (10-50MW) 5,794 6,480 686 
Hydro-electric (<10MW) 5,421 6,692 1,271 
Biomass 
  
 
Biomass power station 2,193 8,980 6,787 
Co-combustion 0 5,036 5,036 
MSW 1,223 1,223 0 
Wind power 19,571 45,511 25,940 
Solar PV 56 609 553 
Biogas 825 1,417 592 
Hydro-electric 
(>50MW), 0%
Hydro-electric (10-
50MW), 1%
Hydro-electric 
(<10MW), 1%
Biomass power 
station, 1%
Co-combustion, 0%
MSW, 0%Wind power, 71%
Solar PV, 22% Biogas, 0%
Solar 
Thermoelectric, 4%
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Solar Thermoelectric 0 1,298 1,298 
Total electricity generated from RET 60,097 102,260 42,163 
Table 3.4. Situation in 2005 and targets for 2010 according to PER – Generation 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, IDAE (2005). 
 
 
3.3. Financing 
The PER estimated that around 23,598 million euros would be the volume of investment needed 
in order to achieve the targets over the period 2005-2010 (see Table 3.5). This volume required 
equity financing (developers) of 4,720 million euros, with the rest to be provided by the market 
(18,198 million euros) and public subsidies (681 million euros). 
 
Source of finance Amount (millions of euros) % 
Developers 4,719 20 
Debt (external) 18,198 77 
Public subsidies 681 3 
Total 23,598 
 
Table 3.5. Financial analysis of the PER 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, IDAE (2005). 
 
The total public financial support for renewable energies was estimated to be approximately 
8,492 million euros, where 3,536 million euros (2,855 + 681) were going to be strictly public aid, 
and charged to the national budget partly in the form of investment subsidies and partly as tax 
incentives for the production of biofuels, and 4,956 million euros for the total support over the 
period through the premium system for the generation of electricity from RET. Thus, under the 
“Public aids” denomination, the PER considered three categories as financing sources: Public 
subsidies, Tax incentives for the use of biofuels, and Premium to electricity generation from 
RET. Table 3.6. shows a summary of these categories and the allocated budget and percentage to 
the total. 
 
Public aids Amount (millions of euros) % 
Public subsidies  681 8 
Tax incentives for the use of biofuels 2,855 34 
18 
Premiums to electricity generation from RET 4,956 58 
Total 8,492 
 
Table 3.6. Public financial support to the PER 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, IDAE (2005). 
 
Public subsidies included the conventional non-recoverable subsidies and those intended to 
improve the conditions for the financing of the investments (681 million euros). Tax incentives 
for the use of biofuels consisted on the tax exemption on hydrocarbons in the selling price of 
biofuels or zero tax rate (2,855 million euros), and the Premiums to electricity generation from 
RET was a financial support for the bulk of electricity generated with RET. Only in two areas, 
solar PV and solar thermoelectric, were premiums planned to be supported with investment aids. 
The implementation of the indicative premiums proposed in the PER implied a steady annual 
increase in the average reference tariff of approximately 0.6 %. 
 
Table 3.7. illustrates the total endowment of the PER, and its distribution during the 
implementing period. 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
Public subsidies (millions of euros) 62 82 115 126 137 156 678 
Tax incentives for the use of biofuels 
(millions of euros) 18 153 328 517 751 1,085 2,852 
Premiums to electricity generation from 
RET (tariff contributions) - (millions of 
euros) 
79 264 521 909 1,352 1,828 4,953 
Total 159 499 964 1,552 2,240 3,069 8,483 
Table 3.7. Endowment of the PER 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, AEVAL (2011). 
 
This financing was planned to be provided by the GOS and by the AACC, although the latter had 
a scant economic contribution. The following table summarizes the estimates for this financing. 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
PER budget (millions of euros) 160.20 499.12 965.95 1,554.28 2,241.94 3,070.70 8,492.19 
AACC contribution (millions of 
euros) -  30.00 44.00 75.00 86.00 95.00 113.00 443.00 
% of contribution 18.70% 8.81% 7.76% 5.53% 4.23% 3.67% 5.21% 
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Table 3.8. PER budget and AACC contribution4 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, AEVAL (2011). 
 
 
3.4. Policy tools 
Following the European model, generation and commercialization of electricity in Spain are both 
deregulated, while transportation and distribution are regulated activities with tolls and tariffs. 
Electricity generation in Spain has two different regimes: the ordinary regime (OR), to which all 
the conventional generation technologies belong to, and the special regime (SR), to which the 
renewable energy generation belongs. Although a wholesale electricity market was created at the 
end of the 90s, a high proportion of domestic consumption continued to be supplied at regulated 
tariff. The regulated rate does not cover all generation and distribution costs, thus leading to a 
deficit (tariff deficit), which is through credits backed by revenue from the electricity system. 
The National energy commission (CNE) estimated that this deficit could be more than 43,000 
million euros by 20205. According to Linares et al. (2008), the Spanish market is a concentrated 
market, with two large firms covering almost 80% of the generation market with four other small 
firms with only some generation capacity. 
 
The SR grants grid access priority and ensures higher remuneration to RET producers. The extra 
cost of the RET is passed on to the electricity system and to consumers through tolls and 
consumption rates. The feed-in-tariff (FIT) of the PFER incorporated both fixed total prices and 
price premiums added to the electricity market price. Tariffs were updated in May 2007 by 
curbing profits for wind generators and setting incentives for other types of renewable energies. 
The new rules set by the PER aimed at guaranteeing an internal rate of return of 7% to wind and 
hydroelectric plants that chose to sell power to distributors directly, and returns of 5% and 9% 
respectively if they participated in the electricity pool market. 
 
As outlined in the PER, project developers had to choose between transferring electricity to the 
system through the transport or distribution grid and therefore being paid a FIT (premium) for it 
                                                 
4
 The differences observed between this table and the previous totals reflect literally which was contained in the 
PER. 
5
 http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/1356305/0/ 
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(constant for all the programming periods), or selling the electricity on the wholesale electricity 
market, having the electricity sale price being the hour price resulted in the wholesale market 
supplemented if any, with a premium. The following table was prepared in the PER to show the 
financing plan per technology. 
 
Renewable energy 
source 
Total financing Premium for 
period 
Tax 
incentives Total 
investment Developer External Public Exemption 
Wind   190,013 760,051 0 189,062 0 950,063 
Hydro 2,351,278 9,405,113 0 2,598,870 0 11,756,391 
10MW 10,915 43,662 0 0 0 54,577 
10-25MW 142,019 284,039 284,039 0 0 710,097 
25-50MW 392,919 1,571,677 0 1,059,922 0 1,964,596 
Solar Thermoelectric 231,366 925,464 0 0 2,855,095 1,156,830 
Solar PV 23,932 95,726 0 49,425 0 119,658 
<100kW w/monitoring 536,922 1,799,610 348,078 0 0 2,684,611 
<100kW fixed 432,500 1,723,800 6,200 559,514 0 2,162,500 
>100kW 33,021 95,762 36,324 0 0 165,107 
Biomass 374,842 1,493,070 6,299 499,415 0 1,874,211 
Totals 4,719,728 18,197,974 680,939 4,956,208 2,855,095 23,598,641 
Table 3.9. Financial analysis of the PER (thousands of euros) 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, AEVAL (2011). 
 
Based on the PER’s financial analysis, project developers would have to invest approximately 
4,719 million euros and the financial markets would have to lend around 18,197 million euros. 
The three public measures considered by the PER were previously described in section 3.3. 
 
In general, the main source of aid for electricity generation from RET was the one provided by 
the PER’s premiums system. This incentive constituted the main mechanism supporting the 
development of these sources. The following table shows the premiums quoted in the PER 
(2005) per generating technology. The following section will present the results of the PER and 
the current available information to help in analysing the results and understanding the 
complexity of implementing these types of plans. 
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Electricity Generation Premium (c€/kWh) 
 
Electricity Generation Premium (c€/kWh)  
Wind   2.9322  Biogas   2.9322 
Hydro   Biomass  
10MW 2.9322  Energy crops <15MW 5.8643 
10-25MW 2.9322  Energy crops 15-50MW 4.3982 
25-50MW 2.1991  Agricultural and forestry wastes 4,3982 
Solar Thermoelectric 18.326  Agro-industry waste 4.3982 
Solar PV   Timber industry waste 2.1991 
<100kW with monitoring 38.4846  Co-combustion 1.4661 
<100kW fixed 38.4846    
>100kW 18.3260    
Table 3.10. Premiums of the PER (2005) 
Source: Adapted from the PER targets, IDAE (2005). 
 
 
3.5. Results of the PER 
3.5.1. Main results 
The PER considered three main targets: 12.10 % of RET over the total primary energy 
consumption, 29.4% of electricity to be generated from RET, and biofuels consumption of 5.75 
% of gasoline and diesel use for transport by 2010. The results presented in this section were 
provided by the IDAE in April 2011 (last ones available). 
 
i) Target 1: 12.10 % of renewable energies over the total primary energy consumption. 
 
The target for primary energy consumption was not fulfilled. Table 3.11. shows that the final 
primary energy consumption from RET was of 11.30 % and therefore did not achieve the 12.10 
% targeted. 
 
Primary energy source 2005 2010 
Natural Gas 20.04 % 23.50 % 
Oil 49.39 % 47.30 % 
Coal 14.58 % 6.30 % 
22 
Nuclear 10.32 % 12.20 % 
Renewable Energies 5.76 % 11.30 % 
Table 3.11. Primary energy consumption in 2005 and 2010 (March 2011) 
Source: Adapted from the AEVAL report (2011). 
 
Figure 3.2. shows the primary energy consumption mix in 2005 and in 2010, where wind and 
hydro representing only 2.9% and 2.8% respectively in 2010. 
  
Figure 3.2. Primary energy consumption mix in 2005 and 2010 (March 2011) 
Source: Adapted from the AEVAL report (2011). 
 
ii) Target 2: 29.4 % of electricity to be generated from RET. 
 
The target for the share of electricity produced from RET was fulfilled according to the results 
presented in the E4 report. For this case, electricity generated from RET reached 33.3 % of the 
total electricity production in 2010. Table 3.12. shows the generation and gross consumption of 
electricity in Spain during the period of the PER. 
 
Electricity generation 2005 (GWh) 
2006 
(GWh) 
2007 
(GWh) 
2008 
(GWh) 
2009 
(GWh) 
2010 
(GWh) 
Conventional 
Coal 81,458 69,850 75,505 49,892 36,864 25,493 
Nuclear 57,539 60,126 55,102 58,971 52,761 61,788 
Natural Gas 82,819 94,706 98,272 122,964 109,565 96,216 
Oil 24,261 22,203 21,591 22,099 20,074 16,517 
Natural Gas
20.04%
Oil
49.39%
Coal
14.58%
Nuclear
10.32%
Hydro 
1.06%
Wind 1.25%
Biomass, 
Waste, 
Biogas 
3.22%
Biofuels 
0.19%
Solar 0.04%
RES, 
5.76%
Natural Gas
23.50%
Oil
47.30%
Coal
6.30%
Nuclear
12.20%
Hydro 
2.80%
Wind 2.90%
Biomass 
and Waste 
3.80%
Rest of RES 
1.90%
RES, 
11.30%
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Hydro from pumping (not RET) 5,153 3,941 3,289 2,817 2,831 3,106 
Total conventional (GWh) 251,740 250,826 253,759 256,743 222,092 203,120 
Renewables 
Hydro 17,872 25,890 27,233 23,271 26,353 42,215 
Wind 21,175 23,297 27,568 32,496 38,091 43,708 
Solar PV 41 119 501 2,541 5,939 6,279 
Solar Thermo 0 0 8 16 103 691 
Thermal RE (Biogas, Biomass, 
etc) 2,652 2,774 2,898 3,696 3,876 4,228 
Total renewables  41,740 52,080 58,208 62,020 74,362 97,121 
Total gross generation 292,970 302,906 311,967 318,763 296,457 300,241 
International exchange (export) -1,344 -3,279 -5,751 -11,039 -8,106 -8,338 
Gross consumption 291,626 299,627 306,216 307,724 288,351 291,903 
Evolution of RET 
contribution 14.3% 17.4% 19.0% 20.2% 25.8% 33.3% 
 
Table 3.12. Generation and gross consumption of electricity in Spain, 2005-2010 
Source: Adapted from CNE, IDAE, Energy Deputy Office and the Ministry of Industry (March 2011). 
 
However, if the results of Red Electrica Española’s (REE – the Spanish Transmission Operator) 
annual report are applicable, the RET contribution to the total reaches a share of 21.76 %. This 
reduction is caused because the REE’s annual report considered RET in a different way than the 
PER. The PER considered all hydro generation as a renewable source but did not consider all 
hydro generation for the PER. Hydro (more than 50MW) from the ordinary regime is not 
considered as a renewable source receiving premium since it does not belong to the special 
regime, where hydro (minihydro, up to 50MW) receives a premium for generation of electricity. 
Table 3.13. shows the REE’s annual results for 2010. 
 
Electricity generation GWh % 
Ordinary regime  
Hydro 38,653 13.39% 
Nuclear 61,990 21.48% 
Coal 25,478 8.83% 
Fuel/Gas 9,553 3.31% 
Combined Cycle 68,595 23.77% 
Total ordinary regime 204,269 70.79% 
Consumption in generation -7,572 
 
Special regime  
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Hydro 6,811 2.36% 
Wind 43,692 15.14% 
Solar PV 6,311 2.19% 
Solar Thermo 692 0.24% 
Thermal RE (Biogas, Biomass, etc) 5,316 1.84% 
Thermal not renewable 29,045 10.07% 
Total renewables 62,822 21.76% 
Total special regime 91,867 31.84% 
Total net generation 288,564   
Consumption in pumping -4,458.00 
 
International exchange (export) -8,333.00 
 
Demand 275,773.00 
 
Balance 12,791.00 
 
Table 3.13. REE’s 2010 Electrical Power Balance 
Source: The Spanish electricity system summary, REE (2010). 
 
iii) Target 3: 5.75 % of biofuels (gasoline and diesel) use for transport. 
 
The target for the use of biofuels as an alternative for gasoline and diesel was not fulfilled. 
Figure 3.3. shows the evolution of the consumption of biofuels over gasoline and diesel (%) 
during the period of the PER. The consumption reached only a 5 % share, below from the 5.75 % 
targeted. 
 
Figure 3.3. Evolution of biofuels over gasoline and diesel 
Source: AEVAL report (2011) 
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3.5.2. Achievements of the RET 
Installed capacity 
 
Renewable energy source / MW Expected increase 2005-2010 
Real installed 
capacity 
increase 2010 
% of target 
achieved 
Hydro-electric (>50MW) 0 0 100 % 
Hydro-electric (10-50MW) 360 192 53.33 % 
Hydro-electric (<10MW) 450 173 38.44 % 
Biomass    
Biomass power station 973 188 19.32 % 
Co-combustion 722 0 0 % 
MSW 0 0 0 % 
Wind power 12,000 12,426 103.55 % 
Solar PV 363 3,749 1,032.78 % 
Biogas 94 59 62.77 % 
Solar Thermoelectric 500 632 126.40 % 
Total installed capacity from RET 15,462 17,419  
Table 3.14. Real installed capacity and degree of achievement of the PER (March 2011) 
Source: Adapted from the AEVAL report (2011). 
 
Table 3.14. indicates that wind energy and solar thermoelectric achieved their targets as planned, 
with approximately 103% and 126% respectively of target achievement. The degree of 
achievement for Solar PV was more than 1,032%, installing more than 3,700 MW. The rest of 
the technologies did not achieve their targets. The total installed capacity by the PER was of 
17,419 MW by 2010. The final installed capacity after the PER finished can be seen in the 
following table. Wind power installed 20,581 MW (46.30 %), and Solar PV installed 3,786 MW 
(8.52 %). 
Renewable energy source / MW Final Installed 
capacity in 2010 
Hydro-electric (>50MW) 13,521 
Hydro-electric (10-50MW) 3,089 
Hydro-electric (<10MW) 1,922 
Biomass  
Biomass power station 532 
Co-combustion 0 
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MSW 189 
Wind power 20,581 
Solar PV 3,786 
Biogas 200 
Solar Thermoelectric 632 
Total installed capacity from RET 44,452 
Table 3.15. Final installed capacity after the PER (March 2011) 
Source: Adapted from the AEVAL report (2011). 
 
Generation 
 
Renewable energy source / GWh 
Expected 
increase 
2005-2010 
Real 
generated 
increase 2010 
% of target 
achieved 
Hydro-electric (>50MW) 0 0 100 % 
Hydro-electric (10-50MW) 686 627 91.40 % 
Hydro-electric (<10MW) 1,271 585 46.03 % 
Biomass    
Biomass power station 6,787 1,317 19.40 % 
Co-combustion 5,036 0 0 % 
MSW 0 0 0 % 
Wind power 25,940 24,137 93.05 % 
Solar PV 553 6,261 1,132.26 % 
Biogas 592 268 45.27 % 
Solar Thermoelectric 1,298 1,144 88.14 % 
Total electricity from RET 42,163 34,340  
Table 3.15. Real electricity generated and degree of achievement of the PER (March 2011) 
Source: Adapted from the AEVAL report (2011). 
 
Table 3.15. illustrates that only the generation from Solar PV achieved the target with a 1,132% 
degree of achievement, corresponding to 6,317 GWh generated, representing around 5,700 GWh 
generated more than what was targeted. Wind power was close to the target with a 93% degree 
of achievement as well as Hydro-electric (10-50MW) with around 91% of degree of 
achievement. The following table shows the final electricity generated by RET in 2010 as a 
consequence of the PER. 
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Electricity Generation (GWh) Final electricity generated in 2010 
Hydro-electric (>50MW) 25,014 
Hydro-electric (10-50MW) 6,421 
Hydro-electric (<10MW) 6,006 
Biomass  
Biomass power station 3,510 
Co-combustion 0 
MSW 1,223 
Wind power 43,708 
Solar PV 6,317 
Biogas 1,093 
Solar Thermoelectric 1,144 
Total electricity generated from RET 94,437 
Table 3.16. Final electricity generated after the PER (March 2011) 
Source: Adapted from the AEVAL report (2011). 
 
After the PER finished , the final total electricity generated  by RET was 94,437 GWh. Wind 
power generated 43,708 GWh (46.3 %), and Solar PV generated 6,317 MW (26.49 %). 
 
3.5.3. Investments of the RET 
According to the results of the PER, the total investment planned for the PER was approximately 
23,084 million euros (see table 3.7. in section 3.3. for more details). The real investment, in 
2010, was approximately 39,237 million euros, an increase of almost 70% of the forecasted 
budget. Per technology, in 2005 wind was planned to receive almost 51% of the total investment 
by 2010, but the final investment received was only 35%. In monetary values, Wind received 
more than was planned (13,630 million euros versus the 11,757 million euros planned). 
 
Solar PV was planned to receive an investment of approximately 2,000 million euros (8.8% of 
the total) but it ended up receiving 19,697 million euros or 50.2% of the total invested in RET in 
2010. This is an increase of more than 865% of the investment planned. Table 3.17. shows the 
planned and real investments per technology in the PER. 
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Electricity generation Plan Invesment (M€) Plan Forecast Real (2010) 
Wind power 11,757.00 13,630.00 
Hydro-electric (<10MW) 700.00 258.90 
Hydro-electric (10-50MW) 250.00 167.90 
Solar Thermal 2,685.00 1,331.50 
Solar Thermoelectric 2,163.00 1,924.00 
Solar PV 2,039.30 19,697.00 
Biomass Thermal 764.40 316.10 
Biomass electrical 1,448.90 553.10 
Biogas 119.70 129.90 
Biofuels 1,156.70 1,229.30 
 
  
Total investment 23,084.00 39,237.70 
Table 3.17. Forecasted and real investment of the PER (March 2011) 
Source: Adapted from the AEVAL report (2011). 
 
3.5.4. Premiums of the RET 
Premiums for the generation of electricity from RET (under the special regime) during the period 
of the PER (2005-2010) were a total of 9,448.50 million euros, where around 66% (6,250 million 
euros) went to the Solar PV technology. Figure 3.4. illustrates the unbalanced distribution of the 
premium among the different technologies.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Premium to RET during the PER 
Source: AEVAL report (2011) 
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After this brief description of the framework of the PER and its main targets and final results, the 
following chapter will look into possible external factors that could have influenced some key 
decisions regarding the deployment of RET policies. As well, it will provide a brief summary of 
the current situation of the Spanish electricity system.  
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4. A review of the Spanish electricity system 
This chapter reviews various literatures related to possible factors that might influence the design 
and implementation of electricity and energy plans, and concludes with information on the 
current situation of the Spanish electricity and energy systems. 
 
4.1. Possible factors influencing electricity plans 
The first part of the chapter looks at possible external factors that might influence the design and 
implementation of electricity plans in Spain. The section will attempt to shed some light on how 
organizations, corporations, and politicians could have influenced decisions in the design and 
implementation of energy plans in Spain. 
 
4.1.1. Influence from corporations 
Since the early 1970s, the United Nations has considered the role and impact of transnational 
corporations (TNCs). Yet over a period of three decades, the UN’s mediated efforts have shifted 
decisively from a ‘‘between-state’’ focus in the regulation of TNCs to a globalized, multi-
stakeholder ‘‘beyond-state’’ process of TNC standard setting (Coleman, 2003). 
 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are central players. They influence the policies of 
governments worldwide and the destinies of individual economies in the developing world. They 
also have a crucial impact on the eco-system, and they can cause first world countries to bend to 
their demands. According to Lewis and MacLeod (2004), it has been detected that the traditional 
Westphalian conception of international law being state-centered is becoming increasingly 
inappropriate in a global society where non-state actors wield great power. 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.1., Iberdrola shares 35% of the installed capacity under the ordinary 
regime and 17% under the special regime, followed by Endesa with 29% and 11% respectively. 
It can be noted that 66% of the electricity generators under the special regime (mainly RET) are 
not related to large corporations. 
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Electricity generating 
corporation 
% of net installed 
capacity – 
ordinary regime 
% of net 
installed capacity 
– special regime 
Iberdrola 35% 17% 
Endesa 29% 11% 
Unión Fenosa 10% 2% 
Gas Natural 5% 3% 
Hidroeléctrica cantábrico 4% - 
Enel 4% - 
Rest 13% 66% 
Table 4.1. Installed capacity per corporation (2008) 
Source: Adapted from MITYC (2008) and corporation’s websites. 
 
Some relevant players that may influence the Government of Spain in the design and 
implementation of the Spanish energy plans are: Iberdrola, Endesa, Gas natural-Fenosa, E-On 
and EDP. These five corporations are the only five members of Unesa, the Spanish Association 
for the electrical industry. Unesa is an organization for the representation, promotion, 
management and defence of the common and general interests of its members as well as the 
electricity sector. Red Electrica Española (REE), the Spanish TSO (Transmission System 
Operator) and the sole transmission agent and operator of the Spanish electricity system is also 
considered due to its relevance in the electricity sector. 
 
The influences of TNCs in Spain should be seen by identifying the owners of these TNCs, their 
business interests, their influence in the successive Governments to regulate the electricity 
system, and the relationship of those TNCs with members of the successive Government 
members (known in Spain as the “revolving door’s effect”6). Iberdrola is owned by a 
construction company called ACS (19%), Qatar Holding (8.4%), Chase Nominees (8,3%), State 
Street Bank & Trust (5.9%), Suez (5%), and three Spanish banks (16.4%) among others. ACS is 
owned by the stock market (35%), Private banking (18%), four private investors (31.9%), and 
Southeastern Asset (6.5%) among others. 
 
                                                 
6
 http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/espana/mientras-tanto/2013-12-22/los-verdaderos-culpables-de-la-subida-de-la-
luz_69265/. 
http://www.eldiario.es/economia/electricas-expresidentes-exministros_0_192130890.html 
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Endesa is owned 92% by the Italian Electricity generator Enel, which is owned at the same time 
by the Government of Italy. Gas Natural Fenosa is owned by the Spanish Bank La Caixa (36.6%) 
and by the Oil company Repsol (31.2%), which is also owned by Free Float (68% including 42% 
of international investments) and PEMEX Mexico (9.5%). According to Sterlacchini (2012), 
Enel is the fifth largest electricity generation company in the world producing 404.3 Billions of 
kWh, and Endesa is the eight largest electricity generation company producing 202.3 Billions of 
kWh. Together, they produce 607.6 Billions of kWh, making them the first in the world. In this 
respect, Red electrica de España (REE), the Spanish TSO (Transmission System Operator) 
should also be considered. REE is the sole transmission agent and operator of the Spanish 
electricity system and is controlled by more than 70% by the stock markets. Due to its dominant 
position in the transportation of electricity in Spain, REE influences the system. 
 
One of the primary goals of corporations is to maximize shareholder value. When the 
shareholders are financial institutions, investment funds, and other large corporations (i.e. in the 
cases of Iberdrola and Endesa), the operations of these corporations will be in line with this 
principal of maximizing the value for shareholders. When looking at Iberdrola’s profile, the 
company’s main revenue activities between 2005-2012, both in Spain and in the foreign market 
was 85,01% from conventional technologies, and 14.99% from RET (excluding large hydro) 
(Iberdrola corporation 2005-2012). 
 
In 2012, Iberdrola’s conventional technologies generation was 78.62% of the total, with RET 
being 21.38% of the share. Figure 4.1. illustrates the Iberdrola’s electricity generation in Spain, 
per technology. 
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Figure 4.1. Iberdrola’s electricity generation in Spain (2012) 
Source: Greenpeace (2013) and Iberdrola’s Annual report (2012) 
 
The total generation of nuclear energy represented 45,55%. Iberdrola is a company with a large 
nuclear component in Spain. In addition, in 2012, the generation from combined cycle power 
plants was only 4.9% of the total. This is key to understanding Iberdrola’s actions and influences 
on the Spanish electricity system. 
 
The significant decline in the generation from combined cycle facilities and the rise in the 
percentage of generation from RET (17.25% in 2011 versus 21.38% in 2012) could have been 
seen as a move to RET by Iberdrola, but this is not clearly a consequence of an increase in RET 
investments by the company. This decline is more due to the fact that over the past five years the 
large electricity companies decided to focus large parts of their business activity in the gas 
sector, and installed massively this type of technology (27,123 MW in Spain, which 5,893 MW 
are Iberdrola’s) (REE 2013). 
 
But there was a great planning problem. In the Spanish electricity system, the combine cycle 
thermal plants contributes to the regulation of the system and they go into operation only when 
there is a high demand for electricity that cannot be covered with others sources such as RET. 
The massive installation of these facilities coincided with a significant increase in the RET 
capacity installed, the Decree of aids to the generation from coal, and to a significant fall of the 
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demand of electricity, which, resulted in a strong decline in the generation of electricity from 
thermal gas plants. In addition, Iberdrola is also a gas producer (Iberdrola 2012). 
The large Spanish electricity generation corporations (the Unesa members) are focused on 
conventional technologies (see Table 4.1.) and have constantly argued about the unsustainability 
of RET in the Spanish system7. In addition, they have also managed to mitigate partly the losses 
related to the combined cycle plants by influencing the successive governments’ decision on 
regulation. 
 
In the Spanish energy regulatory system, particularly in the electricity sector, multiple laws, 
decrees, Ministerial orders, norms, etc are being developed. This makes it very difficult for all 
these regulations to be known and understood in detail. This is something that favors only large 
electrical corporations (Greenpeace 2013). According to the same Greenpeace report, the Unesa 
members have managed to influence the different governments in Spain to develop norms that 
favor their interests over the last thirty years. Some of these achievements stated in the report 
are: 
 
Costs of transition to competition: Law of the electric Sector 1997, which established the 
liberalization of the sector. This law had Mr. Jose Maria Aznar, from the Popular Party – 
Conservative (PP) as Prime Minister, Mr. Josep Piqué as Minister of industry and Mr. Rodrigo 
Rato as Minister of economy (all from the PP party). This law was the end of the liberalisation 
process of the electricity sector. One of the main consequences of the accomplished liberalization 
was the political decision of unlinking costs and revenues of the electric system, so the creation 
of the so-called tariff deficit. This system forces consumers to pay a surcharge each year for the 
deficits of previous years, and requires future consumers, for 15 years, to withstand surcharges 
for what is left each year to pay. In this process the electricity companies also gained an 
additional 3,396 million euros for the so-called costs of transition to competition (CTC)8, which 
could have been used against the tariff deficit, but was not returned. This debt reamins since 
none of the Governments claimed the return of the 3,396 million euros. 
 
                                                 
7
 http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2011/10/27/empresas/1319882343_850215.html 
8
 http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2008/07/02/empresas/1215005981_850215.html 
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In addition, during the energy planning carried out under the Governments of Aznar (1996 – 
2004), priority to natural gas was given and this, together with the way in which the 
"liberalization" was made, gave rise to the gas bubble, which entailed the construction of tens of 
thousands of MW of this technology. 
 
"Windfall profits" or the benefits coming from nowhere: these are benefits that are not a result of 
real competition in a free market but a consequence of the Regulation. This is due to the fact that 
certain facilities (hydro and nuclear) are already redeemed and paid off but still receive the price 
of other technologies that price set the price to meet the demand. In the case of both nuclear and 
hydro power plants, the extra cost or benefits are around 3,000 million euros per year. 
 
CESUR auctions: this is the system to set the price of electricity and was established in 2010. 
This action, both complex and opaque, is to set the prices every term (it has been denounced by 
the National consumer’s organization and investigated by the CNE). The two main issues in the 
auction were the possible alteration of the market prices and the excess of price between the set 
at the auction and subsequent actual price that is paid in the market. The difference between both 
prices would be what theoretically consumers would be paying as a guarantee of having a fixed 
energy price during the term of the tariff and, therefore, not being exposed to variations of the 
same kind in the electricity market. 
 
Initial understandings indicated that the attendees to the auction are divided into two, the energy 
sellers (electrical companies) and the marketers of the last resort (TUR), that are five: Iberdrola, 
Endesa, Gas Natural-Fenosa, E.ON y HC Energía, coinciding with the largest electricity 
generators. The reality is different: the market operator (OMIE), pre-qualifies approximately 50 
firms interested in participating (although approximately only half are normally admitted), but 
only a quarter of them are groups with distributors of the TUR (the only ones that can provide 
the tariffs). In the auction, approximately 65% are firms with headquarters in Spain and only 
35% belong to groups with subsidiaries of generation in the Spanish market. In the auction 
process there are also numerous banks, investment funds, and trading companies, and sometimes 
their names are not published9. Around 1,000 million euros annually is estimated by Greenpeace 
                                                 
9
 http://www.serviciosenergeticos.org/2011/09/vuelta-con-las-subastas-cesur-el-cuento.html 
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that consumers could be saving, but instead goes into important profits for the companies 
participating in the auction. At the time of preparation of this document (end of December 2013), 
the new CNE, the CNMC (National Commission for the Markets and Competition) has 
suspended the CESUR auction planned to set the price of electricity for the first term of 2014. 
 
Payments for capability: in order to cover the investment made by Unesa’s members, and due to 
the excess of installed combined cycles, these facilities charge 20,000 euros/MW for ten years. 
In 2011, the payments for capacity were of 1,535 million euros. 
 
Payments for availability: Mr. Miguel Sebastian, former Minister of industry during Prime 
Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, 2004 – 2011 (PSOE – Socialist party) approved just 
three days before the general election on November 20, 2011, to pay for the availability of the 
combined cycle plants (as requested by Iberdrola and criticised by the CNE)10. This represents a 
disbursement of 190 million euros per year. 
 
Securitisation of the tariff deficit (Matea 2013): the procedure adopted for the securitisation of 
the tariff deficit is a surcharge of 5,000 million euros for the consumers who have to pay the 
interest on this debt to the banks that own it. 
 
Reduction targets by 2020: the Unesa members have fought to reduce to 20% the 2020 RET 
target on the final consumption of energy, which is the minimum required by the European 
directive (Directive 2009/28/EC). The first National draft for the RET action plan 2011-2020 set 
the objective at 22.7% but ultimately was set to 20.8%. 
 
4.1.2. Evolution of regulations and its relationship to corporations 
The last two Administrations, Prime minister Jose Maria Aznar (1996 – 2004) and Prime 
minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero (2004 – 2011) have been particularly sensitive to the 
Unesa demands since it seemed that many of the elaborated norms favored the conventional 
technology sector and served to curb the development of RET in Spain. The best way to look at 
                                                 
10
 http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/11/18/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-18064.pdf 
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all these norms and changes is by looking at their evolution on a timeline approach. Figure 4.2. 
summarizes the main stages in the evolution of the Governments decisions regarding RET in 
Spain, which seems to have been on a rollercoaster for the last three years. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Evolution of political decisions related to RET in the last 13 years 
 
As described in chapter 3, the PER represented the five year period where the deployment of 
RET was active in Spain. During this time, and including the previous RET plan, there were 
seven regulatory directives (three European and four national, see chapter 2 for more details) 
directly related to the renewable energy plans, which is shown in the table below. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Evolution of regulations 2000-2010 
Source: AEVAL report (2011) 
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On January 27th, 2012, the new majority conservative Government (PP) suspended subsidies for 
new renewable energy projects in an attempt to cut the nation's tariff deficit (this decision is 
considered in the design of the Business as Usual scenario). The new law put an end to subsidies 
for new wind, solar, cogeneration and waste-incineration plants. Existing renewable energy 
projects that have already been approved to receive subsidies were not affected by the new 
decree. 
 
This decision attempted “to diminish the public deficit” as each year the “electricity deficit” 
increased between 4,000 to 5,000 million euros, with a cumulative figure of more than 26,000 
million euros by the end of 2013, the so-called “financial black hole”, which was owed to the 
electricity generators11 (basically all Unesa members). According to the Government, this 
decision tried to save more than 160 million euros, but the equivalent reduction did not get to the 
Spanish electricity bill. The Ministry of Industry recognized ex-ante deficits until 2012 and 
established a 15 year maximum period to pay the debt of each year, which meant that the 
Spanish electricity system will finish paying the ‘‘financial black hole’’ by the end of 2027. 
 
During February 2012 more events took place in the electricity sector in Spain. On February 22nd 
Endesa was fined by the Spanish Competency Board due to its dominant position in the Spanish 
electricity market. On February 23rd Iberdrola demanded the immediate stop of public aids for 
renewables as “every day the renewable bubble was increasing”. The same day, Iberdrola 
published their 2011 financial results showing a decrease in profit of 2.3% (up to 2,805 million 
euros). 
 
February 25th 2012 seemed to be the first attempt to suggest an increase in the electricity bill. 
This was supported by the fact that renewable energies were costing too much, and because of 
the debt owed to the main electricity generation companies. On February 29th 2012, Endesa 
publically demanded an increase of 10% in the electricity bill. The same day Endesa published a 
decrease in profit of 46% for 2011. 
 
                                                 
11
 Official press release from MIEYT, 2013. 
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On March 1st 2012, the Government of Spain was sued by the Association of Small Investors for 
pretending to deduct the “debt to the electricity generation companies”, arguing that it could be 
lethal for Spanish confidence and international investors. On March 3rd, 2012, Unesa publically 
claimed that “the only thing they could do was to provide their need to get paid back the debt 
that was owed to them”12. They opposed any kind of public aid since that could distort the 
market, and in 2012 the debt was going to increase in more than 5,000 million euros. 
 
The same day, March 3rd 2012, Mr. Jose Folgado (board member of Fundacion Faes-PP and 
energy expert) was appointed new Managing Director of REE replacing Mr. Luis Atienzia 
(former Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing 1994-1996 with the Socialist Government). 
 
In March 2012 (section B in Figure 4.2.) the first big cut in the RET deployment took place by 
reducing 1,100 million euros from electricity generation companies, 1,400 million euros from 
end users (electricity bill raised by 7%), and 600 million euros from adjustments in Public 
Organizations (CNE, REE, IDAE, etc). 
 
In September 2012 (section C in Figure 4.2.) a new decree set new taxes on electricity generation 
revenues which would bring approximately 2,734 million euros, and a new 6% tax on revenue 
for all electricity generation technologies. 
 
In January 2013, (section D in Figure 4.2.) a law was created that modified the remuneration 
system of the regulated activities and the retribution formula of the special regime´s facilities: 
 
• Retribution was referenced to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
• Now it was to the CPI´s constants taxes, which is, CPI less non-elaborated food and 
energy products. This measure was aimed at saving around 337 million euros. 
• The project owner could choose between Market price+tariff or Tariff. 
                                                 
12
 http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2012/03/06/las-electricas-sin-complejos-lo-unico-que-podemos-hacer-
por-el-deficit-es-cobrarlo-93840 
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• Now every project will have to be under the Tariff formula unless the project owner 
decides to receive only Market price without tariff. This measure was aimed at saving 
between 250 to 500 million euros. 
 
In February 2013, (section E in figure 4.2.) an extraordinary credit of 2,200 million euros were 
charged to the General National budget. 
 
On July 12th, 2013, the Government of Spain, through the Council of Minister, approved the 
energy reform with the aim of balancing the electricity system. This “final” reform hoped to 
“finally balance the electricity system, avoid new imbalances and guarantee consumer supply as 
cheaply and transparently as possible”. According to the Government, the deficit was estimated 
at 4,500 million euros per year, and that now is close to 27,000 million euros. 
 
As stated by the Government in the press release (2013), the new reform was to reduce the 4,500 
million euros by 1) increasing the electricity bill by 3.2%, which will save 900 million euros, 2) 
reducing incentives to the electricity companies, both traditional and renewable technologies, by 
removing the current tariff system to renewable energies, and changing the payment system to 
transportation and distribution companies, which will save 2,700 million euros, and 3) obtaining 
900 million euros from the General National budget (Presupuestos Generales del Estado, in 
Spanish). 
 
Based on this reform, electricity companies will have to assume a loss of 2,700 million euros 
through modifications in the remuneration system. In particular, the reform establishes a new 
remuneration system for generation of renewable energy, cogeneration and waste facilities. 
These facilities will receive a supplement for their investment costs standards-based 
technologies, ensuring a “reasonable profit” 13before taxes that, in principle, will be based on the 
average yield during the previous 10 years for government bonds to 10 years plus 300 basis 
points. This means that the tariff system developed under the PER will be abandoned and 
replaced by another that will try to guarantee the return on the investment at 7.5% (which is the 
result of adding the bond and 300 basis points). This new reform is retroactive and indicates that 
                                                 
13
 Official press release MIEYT, 2013. 
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the worse the economy gets in Spain, the better the renewables will do, and vice versa. This 
argument is related to the notion that this new measure is related to the risk premium of Spain 
which is the difference between the Spanish and German bonds to ten years. 
 
If the Spanish economy does well, the risk will be less and the interests will also be reduced. 
Therefore, if the new retribution is based on the Spanish bond, if the economy does well, the 
RET projects will receive less. It is the opposite of believing that the “technological risk should 
be the one setting the business profits” and not a “reasonable profit” linked to a country’s bond. 
It sounds like establishing a “communism for business profits”. 
 
In addition to the new retribution for RET, transportation and distribution companies will also 
have a new payment system which will mean a strong reduction of their revenue. Payment for 
distribution will consider the average yield during the previous 10 years for government bonds to 
10 years plus 200 basis points (around 6.5% gross). 
 
Finally, the Government will temporarily allow disconnecting (hibernate) some of the combined-
cycle plants, which use gas to generate electricity and that in the current context of lack of 
demand are exploited at 10% of its capacity. The Government will allow this hibernation 
equivalent to 6,000 MW, a quarter of the total number of these facilities. 
 
Up to July 2013 the electricity market in Spain suffered from a continuous trend in regulating 
this market in order to reduce the tariff deficit. Section 4.2. will look at the current situation of 
the electricity market in terms of changes and modification of regulations. The following section 
will look at the relationship that exists in Spain between the politicians and the electricity 
generation corporations.  
4.1.3. The “revolving doors” effect 
An important factor to consider is the “electricity connections” of politicians which has been 
called the “revolving doors” effect in Spain. Many of the largest Spanish electricity companies 
have former politicians within their advisors. 
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Former Socialist Prime Minister, Mr. Felipe González is an independent board member of Gas 
Natural Fenosa, whereas former conservative Prime Minister Mr. José Maria Aznar is an 
independent advisor for Endesa. He is also advisor for News Corporation, the media empire of 
Rupert Murdoch. 
 
Former Minister of Economy, Ms. Elena Salgado, has recently been appointed advisor of an 
Endesa’s subsidiary in Chile. This factor has been supported by Greenpeace Spain in its May 
2013 report implicating Iberdrola at influencing the Government of Spain in almost all the 
decisions regarding the penetration of RET in the last decade.  
 
Mr. De Guindos is an economist who headed Lehman Brothers in Spain from 2006 up until 
2008, headed the PriceWaterhouseCoopers financial division in Spain, as well as was on the 
board of Endesa (with a net income of 368,400€ in 2011) until he left his positions to become the 
current Minister of Economy. The following table illustrates the connection of main politicians 
to the electricity companies. 
 
Corporation Name Ocupation Job position Annual 
revenue 
Endesa Jose María Aznar (PP) Former Prime 
Minister (1996 – 
2004) 
External advisor 
200,000 euros 
 
Elena Salgado (PSOE) Former Government 
Vicepresident of for 
Economic Affairs 
Board member of 
Chilectra (Chile 
subsidy of 
Endesa) 
70,000 euros 
 
Miquel Roca (CIU) Former CIU MP External 
independent 
advisor 
368,000 
 
Luis de Guindos (PP) Minister of Economy External 
independent 
advisor 
368,000 
 
Pio Cabanillas (PP) Former Minister 
Speaker 
Unknown Unknown 
 
Rodolfo Martin Villa (PP) Former Government 
Vicepresident and 
Home minister 
Former President 
of Endesa  
Iberdrola Angel Acebes (PP) Former Government 
Vicepresident and 
Home minister 
External advisor 
400,000 
 
Ramón de Miguel Former Secretary of International Unknown 
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State for foreign 
policy and European 
affairs 
affairs director 
 
Manuel Marín (PSOE) Former Parliament 
President 
President of 
Iberdrola 
Foundation 
 
 
Ignacion Lopez del Hierro 
(Vicepresident of PP´s 
Husband) 
 Independent 
advisor for 
Iberdrola 
Engineering 
 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa 
Felipe González (PSOE) Former Prime 
Minister  
Independent 
advisor 126,500 
 
Narcis Serra (PSOE) 
(2009-2011) 
Former Government 
Vicepresident and 
Defense minister 
External advisor 
126,000 
Enel (Endesa 
since 2011) 
Pedro Solbes (PSOE) Former minister of 
Economy 
Non executive 
board member 250,000 
REE José Folgado (PP) Former Secretary of 
State for Energy 
CEO and 
President 159,000 
 
Luis Atienza (PSOE) Former Minister of 
Agriculture 
Former President Unknown 
 
Miguel Boyer (PSOE) Former Minister of 
Economy and 
Taxation 
Unknown 
95,000 
 
Angeles Amador (PSOE) Former Minister of 
Health 
 95,000 
Abengoa Ricardo Martinez Former Secretary of 
State for Budgeting 
 
 
 
Alberto Aza Former Head of the 
King´s House 
 
 
 
Jose Borrell (PSOE) Former President of 
the European 
Parliament 
Independent CEO 
200,000 
Acciona Pio Cabanillas (PP) Former Minister 
Speaker 
General manager 
for corporate 
image and 
communication 
Unknown 
 
Javier Solana (PSOE) Former High 
representative of 
Foreign affairs for 
the EU 
Unknown 
Unknown 
 
Carmen Becerril (PSOE) Former Secretary of 
State for Energy 
Unknown Unknown 
Table 4.2. Connections of politicians and electricity generators (2013) 
Source: Adapted from Greenpeace (2013) 
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4.1.4. Considerations of influences 
As seen, and according to Bohman (1999), the more and more policies and politicians claim they 
are democratic governments, the more and more they become limited due to the consequences of 
globalization.  Experiences of inadequate global governance lend credence to calls for more 
“cosmopolitan democracies” but such governance cannot, however, be achieved in the usual 
ways; there exist no institutions or set of institutions which could exercise anything like the 
centralized authority and capacity to command obedience analogous to the nation-state’s 
regulation of domestic markets or its exclusive rule of law within its territories. 
According to Sterlacchini (2012) the last two decades have witnessed a staggering decline of 
R&D investment in the fields of energy and electricity. This widespread phenomenon is mainly 
ascribable to the processes of liberalization and privatization of electricity markets, which have 
induced electric utilities to dramatically reduce R&D expenditures. 
 
Industry experts recommended that, to foster the development of safer, cheaper and cleaner 
sources of energy, the current investment in energy R&D should be increased by a factor of four 
in the UE (Advisory Group on Energy, 2005). Obviously, without a radical change in the 
behavior of electric utilities, it will be impossible to mobilize such a huge amount of funds. 
The problem is that companies investing in clean energy technologies need not only generous 
incentives but stable ones, that is available with certainty for a long period of time. Thus, 
‘‘Because the payoffs to their investments depend on the details of public policy several years in 
the future, private-sector actors developing low-carbon energy technologies face substantial 
policy risk; and this may lead to underinvestment’’( Sterlacchini 2012). TNCs, in fact, will focus 
on environmental technologies most likely to generate short-term profits. 
 
TNCs are extremely effective at putting across the ‘business case’ for self-regulation both behind 
the scenes and in public whereas other stakeholders have considerable hurdles to overcome. It is 
the responsibility of international, regional and national actors, governmental and non-
governmental, to ensure economic development without sacrificing common values. TNCs are 
unlikely to regulate themselves voluntarily to generally accepted standards of behavior. 
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The establishment of effective mechanisms for holding TNCs accountable may depend on the 
success of large-scale reforms of international institutions and the redefinition of their mandate. 
‘Robust’ accountability mechanisms require state action, but this action is likely to remain 
problematic if international governance is not democratized. (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). 
 
For these TNCs, new technologies may not be compatible with the characteristics of the existing 
system, and are often handicapped in competition. Furthermore, new technologies represent a 
threat for the established technology and the firms that have invested in it. 
 
RET have not undergone equivalent growth that will improve the technology and reduce their 
costs nor assessed with the criteria used to evaluate the old technology. All of these create 
challenges for policy makers interested in supporting promising new technologies. As 
preferences change over time, existing technology might not be able to meet the new social and 
market demands (i.e., environmental protection). Likewise, some negative features of the old 
technologies which were relatively hidden can manifest and some positive features of the new 
technology can be given value. These provide openings for the new technology. 
 
Spain has been one of the most successful countries in the public promotion of electricity from 
renewable energy sources (RET), particularly wind electricity. Successive reforms have been the 
result of the imbalances between the existing regulation and a growing share of RET, the need to 
maintain an equilibrium between different (and sometimes conflicting) policy criteria and the 
interaction between stakeholders with distinct (and sometimes opposing) interests and with 
different negotiation power. 
 
The Spanish case illustrates that the political commitment of all political parties to continue with 
the FIT scheme and the attitude of key stakeholders is a necessary factor leading to the success 
of the scheme. Once political commitment exists, the issue would be then how to design the 
system properly. 
 
The problem of the subsidies is essentially a political problem, although it has a technical 
foundation. The amount of each specific subsidy is fixed according to a technical evaluation of 
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how far the technology is from commercial maturity, and how much it needs to compensate 
investors. It goes without saying that many of these technical estimates for determining subsidies 
have gone wrong, because of the drop in cost of some critical components, like photovoltaic 
(PV) cells. 
 
According to the Dean of the School of Industrial Engineers (2013), the Spanish electricity 
industry needs a new legal framework and economic structure, and should be based on the triple 
objective accepted worldwide: the security of supply; the environmental quality; the economic 
considerations (i.e. low costs, which are associated to a competitive sector). 
 
The increasing participation of RET in the system is cutting down the participation of 
conventional power plants in matching the electricity demand, which entails that its spot price is 
negligible for very long periods. 
 
It could be said that the Fossil Thermal Leg (FTL) plants have lost some weight in generating 
large amounts of energy (baseload) and have become back-up systems to substitute for RET 
when these plants are not available, either for lack of energy source or for maintenance and 
repairing. This is a completely new scenario that would deserve in-depth discussions about 
electricity policy making. 
 
According to Tester et al (2005) enthusiasm for renewable energy is driven by three desirable 
characteristics: 1) Renewable energy is abundant and available everywhere, 2). It inherently does 
not deplete the earth’s natural resources, and 3). It causes little, if any, environmental damage. 
Although none of these attributes is rigorously true, renewable systems, if deployed correctly, 
come much closer to achieving these ideals than do their fossil and fissile counterparts. 
 
This section has outlined the main possible factors that could have influenced the design and 
implementation of RET and energy policies in Spain. The following section will look at some 
current indicators of situation of the Spanish electricity system. 
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4.2. Current situation of the Spanish electricity system 
The data in this chapter refers to the last three years of available data (2011 to 2013), depending 
on the source used. 
 
Primary energy 
 
Several characteristics could be noted when analysing the Spanish energy system. As mentioned 
earlier, the first thing to be noticed is the high dependence on external resources that the Spanish 
energy supply system has. In 2009, 84% of the total primary energy was imported, according to 
the Energy´s State Secretariat (MIEYT, 2011). In addition, the Spanish system presents high 
energy intensity (EI), which means high energy consumption per unit of gross domestic product 
(GDP), when compared with other European countries. 
 
While EI rates in half of the EU countries were descending until 2005, in Spain the rate was 
increasing. However, since 2005, energy demand has experienced decreases higher than GDP 
values and, therefore, energy intensity has declined both in primary and final energy. This effect 
can be related to the decline of energy consumption in the production sectors due to the 
economic crisis but also to an increase in energy efficiency (EE) and improvement in the 
transformation of primary energy into electricity through the introduction of renewable 
technologies and combined cycle plants (MITYC, 2010). 
 
However, in 2008 the Spanish IE was still 19% higher than in the EU-15. This was mainly with 
the Spanish economic structure, which is based on high energy consumption and low value 
added sectors (i.e. the construction sector), and high energy consumption sectors such as the 
residential and the private transportation sectors (Mendiluce, 2010). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Spanish energy system is characterized by a high participation of fossil 
fuels on the primary energy share. Thus, according to data from the Energy´s State Secretariat 
(MIEYT, 2013) about 80% of the Spanish supply of primary energy in 2012 was of fossil 
sources. 
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According to the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism (MIEYT 2011), the consumption of 
primary energy in Spain in 2011 was 129,339 ktoe, with a decrease of 0.6% from the 2010 value. 
This decrease was caused mainly due to the change of the structure in the electricity generation. 
Due to this, altogether, the generation in 2011 had lower performance from the previous year, in 
terms of primary energy, by the type of technology used. Approximately half (44.9%) of the 
primary energy consumed in Spain was oil-based in 2011, while coal and gas represented 9.59% 
and 22.28%, respectively of the primary energy consumption (Figure 4.4.). 
 
  
Figure 4.4. Primary energy in Spain (2011) 
Source: MIEYT (2011) 
 
Contribution of renewable energies (RET) to primary energy in 2011 was of approximately 
10.4%, with a decrease of 3% from the 2010 value. The percentage contribution of each 
renewable source to the total of renewables in primary energy remained similar to the 2010 
values. After biomass (40.6%), wind energy continues to be the second source of renewable 
energy, followed by hydropower, which contributed with 18%, and biofuels and solar with 9% 
and 8% respectively. 
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Figure 4.5. Composition of renewable energies in primary energy (2011) 
Source: BP Chair (2011) 
 
The level of energy dependency of Spain from external sources is still very high, around 84.3%, 
well above the European average, and continues to worsen due to the increase in the import of 
coal. The energy sector, and therefore the Spanish economy, is exposed to a significant risk of 
fossil fuel prices. Table 4.3. shows the level of dependency of external sources in 2011. 
 
 2011 
Oil 99.80% 
Natural gas 99.84% 
Coal 82.62% 
Nuclear 100% 
Renewable Energies 0% 
Table 4.3. Level of dependency of external sources (2011) 
Source: MIEYT (2011) 
 
Electricity sector 
 
Electricity demand in the Spanish system in 2013 registered its third consecutive annual decline, 
falling to 260,870 GWh14, 2.3% lower than 2012. Electricity generated from RET comprised the 
electricity generation from hydro plants (excluding pumping), wind, solar, geothermal and 
                                                 
14
 Based on the preliminary report “The Spanish Electricity System preliminary report 2013” by REE (December 
27th,2012) 
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electricity from biomass/wastes. Gross national electricity consumption comprises the total gross 
national electricity generation from all fuels (including auto-production), plus electricity imports, 
minus exports (Eurostat 2012). The electricity generated in Spain in 2013, can be seen in Table 
4.4. Total generation from conventional technologies (under the ordinary regime) declined 
10.45% from 2012 to a value of 168,932 GWh. Total ordinary represented around 61.7% of the 
total electricity generated in Spain, with Nuclear having the largest share, 20.6%, followed by 
Coal with 15.5%, and large Hydro and Combined cycles with 12.5% and 10.6% respectively. 
 
Under the special regime (where RET are registered) Wind generated 54,301 GWh, a 19.8% of 
the total, representing an increase of 12.03% from the 2012 value. Minihydro and Solar 
Thermoelectric represented the bigger increases in the total generation, with 53.14% and 32.27% 
respectively, and with a total generation of 7,098 GWh and 4,554 GWh respectively. The only 
technology that declined from the 2012 values was Thermal not RET (cogeneration) with a 
decrease of 4.17% to an equivalent electricity generated value of 32,309 GWh. In general, 
electricity generated from RET (including large hydro) represented 41.5% of the total electricity 
generated in Spain in 2013. 
 
Technologies GWh % Variation from 2012 
Hydroelectric 34,205 12.5% 75.8% 
Nuclear 56,378 20.6% -8.28% 
Coal 42,384 15.5% -26.5% 
Fuel/Gas 6,981 2.6% -7.43% 
Combined Cycle 28,983 10.6% -31.82% 
Total ordinary regime 168,932 61.7% -10.45% 
Self consumption -7,012    
MiniHydroelectric 7,098 2.6% 53.14% 
Wind 54,301 19.8% 12.03% 
Solar PV 8,397 3.1% 2.77% 
Solar Thermoelectric 4,554 1.7% 32.27% 
Thermal RE (Biogas, Biomass, etc) 5,050 1.8% 6.00% 
Total RET special regime 79,370 29.0% 14.27% 
Thermal not renewable (Cogen.) 32,309 11.8% -4.17% 
Total special regime 111,679 40.8% 8.24% 
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Total net generation 273,598    
Pumped storage consumption -5,769  
 
Peninsula link 0  
 
International exchange (export) -6,958  
 
DEMAND 260,870  -2.3% 
BALANCE 
 
 
 
Table 4.4. National Electricity Balance (2013) 
Source: Adapted from REE (2013) 
 
The evolution of total electricity generated in Spain (since 2005) is shown in Figure 4.6. It shows 
that demand has returned to the levels of 2005, also shows the evolution of RET during the 
period. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Evolution of electricity generation in Spain (2013) 
Source: Adapted from REE (2013) 
 
Table 4.4. also indicates that the electricity generated from fossil and external sources 
(conventional technologies), represented around 58.5% of the total net electricity generated in 
Spain in 2013. Figure 4.7. illustrates the evolution of the generation of electricity from 
conventional technologies in Spain. 
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Figure 4.7. Evolution of electricity generation from conventional technologies in 
Spain (2013) 
Source: Adapted from REE (2013) 
 
Electricity generation from conventional technologies have declined substantially since 2005. 
The larger reduction comes from the combined cycle technology, which has been replaced 
mainly by RET. In 2005, Coal represented 29% of the total generation and in 2013 it represents 
only 15%, a decline on almost half (Figure 4.7.). Nuclear remains stable for the period, with 
around 20% of the total electricity generated, and Wind represents the highest increase in the 
period, going from 7% of electricity generated in 2005, to a 19% of the total electricity generated 
in Spain in 2013. 
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Figure 4.8. Comparison of electricity generated in Spain (2013) 
Source: Adapted from REE (2013) 
 
Spain has a good potential of renewable energies, especially wind and solar. In the last five years 
these technologies have experienced a huge growth in both installed capacity and electricity 
generation. In 2009, according to data from the European barometer of renewable energies 
(EurObserv'ER 2011), Spain ranked first in production of electricity from wind energy, and 
second in accumulated capacity, just behind Germany. The following figure illustrates the 
evolution of electricity generated from RET in Spain from 2005 until 2013. 
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Figure 4.9. Evolution of electricity generation from RET technologies in Spain (2013) 
Source: Adapted from REE (2013) 
 
RET technologies have increased substantially since 2005. Wind becomes the first technology to 
show an important increased since 2005 followed by Solar PV and Solar thermoelectric, which 
show relevant increases after 2008 and 2011 respectively. 
 
The installed capacity in the Spanish system closed 2013 at 102,281 MW installed, 556 MW 
more than in 2012. The greatest increase was recorded by Solar thermoelectric (15% or 300 
MW) and Solar PV (3.3% or 140 MW). Other technologies have not experienced power 
variations or have been insignificant. Table 5.5. shows the installed capacity per technology in 
the Spanish system in 2013. Renewables (Hydroelectric + Special regime) represented more than 
48% of the total power, two points more than the previous year. 
 
The share corresponding to RET (excluding Hydroelectric) was 31.29% of the total, with wind 
representing 22.17% (22,573 MW) and Solar PV representing 4.22% (4,298 MW) of the total. 
Renewables represented 46 % of the total power on the peninsula, two points more than the 
previous year 
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Technologies MW % Variation from 2012 
Hydroelectricity 17,766 16.43% 0.0% 
Nuclear 7,866 7.27% 0.0% 
Coal 11,641 10.76% 0.2% 
Fuel/Gas 3,498 3.23% 2.0% 
Combyne Cycle 27,206 25.15% 0.0% 
Total ordinary regime 67,978 62.86% 0.1% 
MiniHydroelectric 2,058 1.90% 0.7% 
Wind 22,900 21.17% 0.8% 
Solar PV 4,681 4.33% 3.2% 
Solar Thermo 2,300 2.13% 15.0% 
Thermal RE (Biogas, Biomass, etc) 984 0.91 % 2.9% 
Total RET special regime 31,866 30.44%  
Thermal not renewable 7,248 6.70% -1.5% 
Total special regime 39,106 38.40% 1.4% 
TOTAL 101,828   0.6% 
Table 4.5. Installed capacity in Spain (2012) 
Source: Adapted from REE (2013) 
 
In terms of solar energy, Spain stood second in solar PV’s cumulative capacity, and first in 
thermo solar energy. This positioning has also favoured the development and growth of an 
industry sector with great potential to be exported to countries inside and outside the EU (San 
Miguel G. et al., 2010). It is also worth to be mention the great insight in the system of 
combined-cycle natural gas plants which, in 2009, accounted for 92% of the gas plants’ capacity 
installed. 
 
Capacity factors in Spain 
 
In addition to concerns on the trends in overall support costs, the system did not seem to have 
stimulated the efficiency of production. The capacity factor parameter has been stagnant in the 
case of wind energy and has declined in solar PV. In other words, it is arguable whether a FIT 
encourages the deployment of RET in places with low resource potential. 
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By taking the values for the last eight years of the electricity generated and the installed capacity 
in Spain, the capacity factors (CFs) can be calculated. The following table shows the evolution 
and average of CFs per electricity generation technology for the reference period. 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 AV. 
Hydro 13.14% 17.36% 18.06% 14.64% 16.35% 25.12% 18.00% 12.50% 21.98% 17.46% 
Nuclear 83.40% 88.95% 81.52% 87.01% 78.06% 90.99% 84.65% 89.36% 81.82% 85.08% 
Coal 77.40% 66.31% 72.17% 47.62% 35.89% 24.46% 43.41% 55.98% 41.56% 51.64% 
Oil 23.91% 17.48% 16.20% 16.97% 19.74% 19.06% 15.76% 25.10% 22.78% 19.67% 
Gas (CC) 44.25% 46.62% 37.29% 47.15% 38.15% 28.98% 23.18% 17.84% 12.16% 32.85% 
Wind 23.81% 23.20% 22.13% 25.95% 22.38% 24.69% 22.99% 24.35% 27.07% 24.06% 
Solar PV 12.72% 16.21% 9.13% 25.41% 20.32% 19.78% 22.03% 20.55% 20.48% 18.51% 
Solar TE 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 37.00% 4.49% 11.58% 24.41% 19.65% 22.60% 19.96% 
Table 4.6. Evolution of capacity factors in Spain (2013) 
Source: Adapted from REE (2005-2013) 
 
Average CF for wind and solar PV in Spain resulted in 23.71% and 18.22% respectively. The 
highest CF´s technology in Spain was for nuclear, with 85.49%, and the lowest was for oil 
generation with a CF of 16.14%. 
 
Levelized costs 
 
The following table summarizes the value of levelized costs for key technologies in Spain. 
Technology Approximate Levelized costs 
Wind 61,54 euros/MWhc 
Solar PV 420,90 euros/MWhc 
Solar TE through CSP 98-126 euros/MWhc 
Biogas 80-130 euros/MWha 
Biomass Thermal 80-150 euros/MWha 
Hydro 53,50 euros/MWha 
Nuclear 53,84 euros/MWha 
Combine cycle (imported Coal) 52,03 euros/MWhb 
Combine cycle (domestic Coal) 67,76 euros/MWhb 
Combine cycle (domestic + CCS Coal) 69,07 euros/MWhb 
Combine cycle (Gas) 56,10 euros/MWhb 
Table 4.7. Levelized cost in Spain (2013) 
Source: Adapted from Salvador (2010)a, US department of Energy (2011)b and Ciemat (2010)c 
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Demand coverage 
 
Regarding demand coverage on the Spanish system, nuclear headed the list covering 22.1% of 
demand (21% in 2011), followed by coal fired power stations that increased their contribution to 
19.3% (15.4% in 2011) and wind power with a share of 18.1% (16% in 2011) (REE 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Annual demand coverage of electricity demand (2012) 
Source: REE (2012) 
 
In 2012, the whole technologies classified as renewables covered 31.8% of the demand. 
 
According to REE (2012) the annual maximum of instantaneous, hourly and daily demand for 
the Spanish system again stood below the all-time maximums recorded five years ago. On 
February 13th at 8:21 pm there was maximum demand for instantaneous power of 43,527 MW 
(the all-time record of 45,450 MW was set in 2007). On the same day in February, between 8:00 
pm and 9:00 pm, the maximum hourly demand was set at 43,010 MWh (the all-time record of 
44,876 MWh was set in 2007). Also, on February 8th the annual maximum of daily energy of 873 
GWh was reached (the all-time record of 906 GWh was set in 2007). 
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Figure 4.11. shows the contribution of technologies at the peak demand of 43,010 MWh. For 
RET, wind contributed with 20.9 % followed by Hydroelectric with 8.9 % and renewable 
thermal and solar thermoelectric with 1.1% and 0.6 % respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Coverage of peninsular maximum hourly demand - 13 February 2012 
(9:00 pm -10:00 pm) (2012) 
Source: REE (2012) 
 
It should also be noted that the future of nuclear policy is uncertain. Although there is not a 
nuclear moratorium in Spain, the country does not have medium-term plan for replacing the 
nuclear fleet. This would lead to an abandonment of nuclear energy from fission by 2028 with 
the decommissioning of the last facility, without taking into account a possible lengthening of 
nuclear facilities or the installation of new facilities based on advanced generation. 
 
Premium to RET 
 
Around 39,819 million euros were paid in FIT for the special regime (Renewables + Waste + 
Waste treatment + CHP). Of those 39,819 million euros in FIT, around 29,110 million euros 
(73.10%) went to Renewables. 
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The special regime created 63,801 installations. Of those, 98.59% (62,906) were renewable 
installations. Of those 62,906 renewable installations, 95.9% (4,588 MW) were Solar PV, and 
2% were Wind (22,658 MW). Solar PV generates (or sells) 4,047 GWh (9.6% of the total 
renewables) and Wind generates 29,564 GWh (70% of the total renewables). 
 
The current amount delivered to RET in the form of premiums is around 39,656 million euros 
since the beginning of the PER. Solar PV normally receives around 33% of this amount, Wind is 
around 26%, and Cogeneration receives around 20% of the total. Other technologies receiving 
less share of this amount are: Solar Thermoelectric (7%), Waste management (5%) and Hydro 
and Biomass with around 3% and 3.75% respectively. The following table illustrates the 
evolution of the premiums since 2009 up to 2013. 
  
 Premiums 
(million euros) 
2009 6,521 
2010 7,066 
2011 6,984 
2012 8,585 
2013 10,500 
Total 39,656 
Table 4.8. Evolution of premiums toRES in Spain (2013) 
Source: Adapted from the Dean of Spanish Industrial Engineers (2013) 
 
 
Price of Electricity-End User 
 
In Spain, electricity prices grew more than the rest of the European countries, surpassing in 
absolute terms the EU average, both for the residential and for the industrial sectors. The price of 
electricity for household consumers in 2012 was 0.177 kWh, and the price of electricity for 
industrial consumers during the same year was 0.116 kWh, both the third more expensive prices 
in the EU (Eurostat 2012). Figure 4.12. illustrates the comparison of electricity prices for 
residential consumers. 
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Figure 4.12. European electricity prices for residential consumers (2013) 
Source: MIEYT and Eurostat (2013) 
 
Electricity Bill 
 
The electricity bill in Spain reflects 50% of the price of energy (set by public auctions) and the 
other 50% is what the Government calls the “tolls” which is controlled by the Ministry of 
Industry. In this 50%, the aids for RET are included along with many other concepts such as 
extra-peninsular expenses, transmission, distribution, taxes, etc. This is where the Government 
“increased” the bill. Figure 4.13. illustrates the composition of the Spanish electricity bill. 
 
It has been argued by the RET producers that there is a need to revise the other 50% costs 
included in the electricity bill, the so-called “windfall profits”, that are the profits that the 
electricity generation companies obtained for already paid off conventional plants. 
 
The Consumers and Users Organization recently complained that the 61% increase in the 
electricity bill over the last five years had nothing to do with renewables aids but with “an 
ominous regulation for electrical companies that do not stop making money”. They also argued 
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that electricity generation companies benefit from an unfair and opaque mechanism that hides 
the real cost of electricity. The following figure illustrates the main breaks that compose the 
electricity bill in Spain. 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Electricity bill composition in Spain 
Source: Presentation on the new electricity reform, September 2103. MIEYT (2013) 
 
 
Tariff Deficit 
 
By the end of 2013, tariff deficit in the electricity sector will reach 30,000 million euros 
(approximately 700 euros per person) according to the British Petroleum (BP) Chair (2012). 
 
CO2 emissions 
 
Following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol - protocol approved by the EU through the Decision 
2002/358/EC – and the adoption of new European directives that limited GHG emissions to the 
atmosphere from some industrial sectors, emissions ceiling for each member country were 
established (Directive 2003/87/EC, Directive 2004/101/EC and recently Directive 2009/29/EC). 
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Following these agreements, Spain pledged not to exceed the annual CO2 emissions above + 
15% compared to the base year. The figure below reflects the established emissions cap. The 
increase of CO2 during the last decade of the last century should be noted as the 2000 ceiling 
value had already doubled (in 2000 CO2 emissions reached 31% compared to the base year). 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Evolution of CO2 emission in Spain 
Source: REE (2012) 
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Figure 4.15. Evolution of CO2 emission from energy processes in Spain compared to 
total emissions 
Source: Cabal H. presentation on the CO2 comet 
 
Such growth of CO2 emissions was only truncated significantly and continuously after year 
2007. Emissions for 2010 were about 353.9 MtCO2  (+22,13% compared to the base year).  
 
The Spanish energy sector emitted 264 MtCO2 (92.9% of total CO2) in 2012. CO2 emissions 
from the energy system, which are 80% of the total of CO2 in Spain, rose 2% in 2011, mainly by 
the increase in the participation of the coal and the minor contribution of hydropower in the 
electrical mix compared to 2010. In Spain, the total increase of CO2 emissions in 2011 was 
1.81% compared to 2010, and 8% compared to the year 2000 values. In 2012, CO2 emissions 
from the electricity system were estimated at 80 million tonnes, 10% higher than the previous 
year, which was mainly due to increased coal-fired generation (REE 2012). 
 
The Spanish energy system generates high CO2 emissions as a direct consequence of this 
structure. The trend of CO2 emissions was rising in 2007 with a growth well above the 
committed Kyoto Protocol’s target, which exceeded 51% from base year levels. However, from 
2008-2010, the emissions decreased to 247 MtCO2, according to MIEYT (MIEYT, 2011). 
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According to the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture 2013) Spain will need to 
purchase CO2 emission credits for a value of between 1,170 and 1,620 million euros to meet the 
Kyoto target. Spain can only increase their emissions by 15% in the period 2008-2012 (from the 
base year value in 1990) but the emissions stood at 22.8%. In particular, CO2 emissions in the 
industrial and energy sectors (subject to the buying/selling of rights’ market) increased 9.2% in 
2011 (Ministry of agriculture 2013). According to the Ministry, this 9.2% increase was mainly 
due to the effects that were produced by the Coal Decree, passed by the Government of Spain in 
2010, to promote the domestic coal burning. 
 
In order for Spain to comply with the first period of Kyoto (2008-2012), the country invested 
approximately 770 million euros to acquire carbon credits for that period (Oficina de Cambio 
Climático, Ministerio de Agricultura, 2012), bringing to Spain 159 MtCO2 to deduct from their 
emissions. According to the European Environment Agency (EEA) Spain is, together with 
Austria, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg, the European country that needs to buy more CO2 
emission rights in proportion to its emissions. In Spain the gap between what should be reduced 
and the actual emissions are comparatively very large. It is 13%, when the average of European 
countries is 1.9%. For Spain to continually meet the Kyoto targets, the country will have to buy 
"significant quantities" of emission rights in the future. According to the Ministry (Ministry of 
Agriculture 2013) the Government of Spain will have to purchase a final 105 MtCO2 tons until 
2014 in order to comply with Kyoto, which could cost between 500 and 800 million euros more. 
 
These credits have been purchased only to cover the emissions of what is called diffuse sectors 
(transport, agriculture, residential and waste). The Industrial and Energy sectors, as mentioned 
earlier, have a buying/selling market to operate. The Industrial sector received a free allocation 
of CO2, but with the crisis and the decline in production, they emitted much less than expected, 
so they sold their surpluses in large quantities. Some companies have earned millions of euros 
selling what they received free; meanwhile, the Government must pay for sectors that did not 
receive compensations, and for which they are responsible for, and have less lowered emissions, 
according to the EEA (2013). Most of the reduction of CO2 emissions in Spain can be directly 
related to the economic crisis that the country is still in. 
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Summary 
 
It can be argued that based on the information presented in this chapter, the Spanish energy 
system is unsustainable and there is a need for a shift to a more sustainable energy system 
through changes in not only supply and demand, but in the reasoning behind the design of RET 
plans. The following chapter introduces the model identified to be used in this document, which 
follows the approaches of Labriet et al. (2010). 
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5. Application of the TIMES-IB model to the Spanish 
energy system 
This section examines the mathematical model proposed in chapter 1 and it will be based on the 
Spanish energy system. 
 
As concluded in chapter 4, it is clear that the Spanish energy system is unsustainable and there is 
a need for a shift to a more sustainable energy system through changes in both supply and 
demand. From the demand point of view, for instance, it will be necessary to introduce efficiency 
and energy saving measures in all consuming sectors (residential, services, transport, industry, 
etc). From the supply point of view, the use of renewable energies and more efficient 
technologies that decrease the need for imports of fossil fuels must be promoted in order to 
contribute to reduce CO2 emissions and meet the required targets. 
 
In order to deploy these changes, important investments will be required. This makes essential 
the need for credible and reliable prospective studies that explore possible paths to meet the 
targets. These studies should take into consideration the evolution of determining factors in the 
future demand such as the growth of the population and the growth of the economy (represented 
by GDP). They should also consider the current energy system and its ability to grow with all the 
possible technological alternatives, current and future, in a cost efficient manner, as well as 
complying with environmental obligations (Cabal and Lechon 2011). 
 
Energy optimization models are tools that allow combining all these parameters in a modelling 
exercise and thus providing a solution as a medium to long term optimal energy system where 
energy demand is satisfied under certain environmental, political, technological, or economic 
constraints. In this document a model of this kind will be used and applies the approaches of 
Labriet et al. (2010) to show a possible way to achieve a more sustainable energy sector in the 
year 2050. 
 
 
 
67 
5.1. The Times model generator 
An energy model is a mathematical representation of an energy system (Figure 5.1. shows a 
diagram overview of the development and use of a generic energy system model). There are 
many types of energy models but this document only considers optimization energy models that 
are used for the representation, optimization and analysis of energy systems. Optimization could 
be seen as the maximization of the total value (supplier and consumer) given the characteristics 
of the energy system (technologies, resources, etc) and satisfying the demand of final energy 
services or any other environmental (CO2 emissions), economic or political constraints 
(Directive 2009/28/CE). 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Overview of an energy system model 
Source: Gargiulio, M., Universidade Nova De Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal. 12-14 December, 2012 
 
The TIMES model generator has been chosen for this document as a techno-economic 
equilibrium generated model since it provides relevant options to decision makers regarding 
energy systems (economically affordable, technically feasible, and environmentally sustainable), 
ensures that the present energy systems (in equilibrium) follows a consistent path on the long 
term, and determines what technologies are competitive, marginal or uncompetitive in each 
market, in a system view. 
68 
The Integrated MARKAL–EFOM15 System (TIMES) is a bottom-up technology rich 
optimisation model using linear programming and representing the whole energy system of the 
region of analysis from resource extraction to final consumption. It combines advanced versions 
of MARKAL models and is a model generator developed by ETSAP (Energy Systems Analysis 
Programme)16 which is a multilateral international agreement, promoted and sponsored by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) involving national teams in nearly 70 countries. 
 
The user provides estimates of end-use energy service demands (e.g., car road travel; residential 
lighting; steam heat requirements in the paper industry; etc.), estimates of the existing stock of 
energy related equipment in all sectors, and the characteristics of available future technologies, 
as well as present and future sources of primary energy supply and their potentials. Using these 
as inputs, the TIMES model aims to supply energy services at minimum global cost (more 
accurately at minimum loss of surplus) by simultaneously making equipment investment and 
operating, primary energy supply, and energy trade decisions, by region (Loulou et al. 2005). 
 
The TIMES energy economy is made up of producers and consumers of commodities (energy 
carriers, materials, energy services, emissions, etc). and like most equilibrium models assumes 
competitive markets for all commodities. The result is a supply-demand equilibrium that 
maximizes the net total surplus (i.e. the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surpluses). TIMES 
may, however, depart from perfectly competitive market assumptions by the introduction of 
user-defined explicit constraints, such as limits to technological penetration, constraints on 
emissions, exogenous oil price, etc. Market imperfections can also be introduced in the form of 
taxes, subsidies and hurdle rates. 
 
The main features of a model generated by the TIMES model generator are: 
 
• It is a bottom-up energy model which uses an extensive economic, technical and 
environmental data base of hundreds of current and future energy technologies of the 
                                                 
15
 MARKAL (MARket Allocation model, Fishbone et al. 1981, 1983, Berger et al. 1992) and EFOM (Voort van der 
et al. 1984) are two bottom-up energy models which inspired the structure of TIMES. 
16
 http://www.iea-etsap.org/web/index.asp 
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energy system (e.g., Spain's) in order to analyze this information in detail and provide a 
single solution. 
• It provides a prospective analysis on a long term horizon (20- 50-100 years).  
• It provides an optimal technology selection. 
• The demand is elastic, depends on the variation of prices. 
• The solution represents the simultaneous decisions on equipment investment and 
operation, primary energy supply and energy commodities trade, both quantities and 
prices of various commodities are endogenously computed such that they are in 
equilibrium (Labriet et al. 2010). 
• The service demand considers five sectors: agriculture, commercial, residential, 
transportation and industry. 
• The energy supply side comprises: the electricity and heat production; the high, medium 
and low voltage grids (included as two separated heat grids for high temperature and low 
temperature heat); the refineries (modelled using a generic refinery structure) and the 
mining and extraction of primary energy resources (modelled using cost supply curves). 
• The model includes detailed information about the potential of RET and various 
availability factors for RET depending on the season of the year. 
• The model includes CO2 emissions for all processes occurring in the energy system. 
• It works based on partial and dynamic equilibrium properties. In equilibrium because the 
suppliers provide exactly the number of units of the processes that those consumers need 
(see Figure . Partial because only a part of the economy is modeled, in this case the 
energy sector. It is a dynamic model since it generates results for different periods of time 
at the same time. The perfect market involves that no participant can individually 
influence any power over the others and all the participants have access to information, 
everyone knows what the demand will be at a future time and which technologies and 
fuels will meet this demand. 
 
According to Loulou et al. (2005) a supply-demand equilibrium model has as economic 
rationale: the maximization of the total surplus, defined as the sum of suppliers and consumers 
surpluses. The mathematical method used to maximize the surplus must be adapted to the 
particular mathematical properties of the model. In TIMES, these properties are:  
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• Outputs of a technology are linear functions of its inputs; 
• Total economic surplus is maximized over the entire horizon, and 
• Energy markets are competitive, with perfect foresight. 
 
And as a result of these assumptions the following additional properties hold: 
• The market price of each commodity is equal to its marginal value in the overall system, 
and 
• Each economic agent maximizes its own profit or utility. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Illustration for market equilibrium. 
Source: Gargiulio, M., Universidade Nova De Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal. 12-14 December, 2012 
 
A linear programming problem consists in the minimization (or maximization) of an objective 
function defined as a mathematical expression of decision variables, subject to constraints (also 
called equations17) also expressed mathematically. Very large instances of linear programs 
involving hundreds of thousands of constraints and variables may be formulated in the GAMS 
language, and solved via powerful linear programming optimizers. The linear program described 
in this chapter is much simplified, since it ignores many exceptions and complexities that are not 
essential to a basic understanding of the principles of the model (Loulou et al. 2005). An 
optimization problem formulation consists of three types of entities: 
                                                 
17
 This rather improper term includes equality as well as inequality relationships between mathematical expressions. 
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• the decision variables: i.e. the unknowns, or endogenous quantities, to be determined by 
the optimization, 
• the objective function: expressing the criterion to be minimized or maximized, and 
• constraints: equations or inequalities involving the decision variables that must be 
satisfied by the optimal solution 
 
The decision variables represent the choices to be made by the model, i.e. the unknowns, and 
some of the decision variables used in the TIMES model could be summarized in: new capacity 
addition (investment) for technologies (NCAP(r,v,p)), installed capacity of processes 
(CAP(r,v,t,p)), total installed capacity of technologies (CAPT(r,t,p)), activity level of 
technologies (ACT(r,v,t,p,s)), the quantity of commodities consumed or produced by processes 
(FLOW(r,v,t,p,c,s)), quantity of commodities sold (exp) or purchased (imp) 
(TRADE(r,t,p,c,s,imp)), and demand for end-use energy services (D(r,t,d)) among a few others. 
The TIMES objective function (discounted total system cost): The surplus maximization 
objective is first transformed into an equivalent cost minimization objective by taking the 
negative of the surplus, and calling this the total system cost. The TIMES objective is therefore 
to minimize the total cost of the system, properly augmented by the ‘cost’ of lost demand. All 
cost elements are appropriately discounted to a selected year (Loulou et al. 2005). Each year, the 
total cost includes some elements including Capital Costs incurred for investing into and/or 
dismantling processes; Fixed and variable annual Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs; 
Fixed and variable annual Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs, and Taxes and subsidies 
associated with commodity flows and process activities or investments among others. 
 
According to Loulou et al. (2005) TIMES takes special to precisely track the monetary flows 
related to process investment and dismantling, but this tracking is complex for many factors. In 
addition, although these factors add precision and realism to the cost profile, also introduce 
complex mathematical expressions in the objective function. The following figure illustrates a 
simplified formulation that does not provide those complex expressions, limiting the description 
to giving general indications on the cost elements composing the objective function. 
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Figure 5.3. Simplified TIMES objective function 
Source: Loulou et al. (2005) 
 
Where: 
NPV is the net present value of the total cost for all regions (the TIMES OBJ); 
ANNCOST (r,y) is the total annual cost in region r and year y; 
dr,y is the general discount rate; 
REFYR is the reference year for discounting; 
YEARS is the set of years for which there are costs; 
R is the set of regions in the area of study. 
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Figure 5.4. Total annual cost simplified equation 
Source: Cabal, H., (2011). Introducción a los modelos energéticos presentation 
 
Finally, while minimizing total discounted cost the TIMES model must satisfy a large number of 
constraints which express the physical and logical relationships that must be satisfied in order to 
properly depict the associated energy system. TIMES constraints are of several kinds and the 
main ones can be listed as: capacity transfer (conservation of investments), definition of process 
activity variables, use of capacity, commodity balance equation, constraints on commodities, and 
user constraints, to name some of them. 
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5.2. The Times-IB model 
The model used in this document is the TIMES-IB (Iberia: Spain + Portugal) model. The 
TIMES-IB model is a techno-economic model of the Spanish and Portuguese energy systems 
resulting from the interaction and participation of various European projects and entities 
including the CIEMAT in Spain, EU projects such as NEEDS and RES2020, and forming part of 
the Pan European Times (PET) model which considers the energy system of the EU27 plus 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. This model is built following the same structure of the “family 
of TIMES models”18 described in the previous section, adapted to the Spanish and Portuguese 
energy system, and based on the parameters of the COMET project19 (Figure 5.5. illustrates the 
origins of TIMES-IB). 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Origins of Times-IB. 
Source: Cabal, H. presentation. ETSAP workshop, Cape Town 22nd June 2012. 
 
The model was developed for the project COMET (Integrated infrastructure for CO2 transport 
and storage in the west Mediterranean – a join research Project co-financed by the European 
                                                 
18
 As discussed earlier in this document, the family of times models were developed over a long period of time by 
several experts, and for this thesis, the TIMES-IB model has been accommodated in order to address the research 
questions raised in chapter 1. 
19
 http://comet.lneg.pt 
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Seventh Framework Programme (FP7)), and considered the significant role for carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) technologies, and was based on four main conditions (Boavida et al. 2011): 
 
1. CO2 capture technology will be available in the model; 
2. The option will be competitive; 
3. Sufficient and suitable underground storage capacity will be available, and 
4. CO2 transport infrastructure is available or construction of such an infrastructure can be 
built within the near future. 
 
Figure 5.6. illustrates the high level block diagram (Reference Energy System) of the national 
TIMES model. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Single region reference energy system. 
Source: Cabal, H. et al. presentation. CO2PipeHaz ‐ COCATE, Lisbon, December 12, 2012. 
 
In addition, the model runs for the period 2000–2050 in 5-year intervals. It is calibrated for the 
years 2000 and 2005 to the energy balances of the two countries available in the Eurostat 
database provided by the Statistical Office of the European Communities, completed by other 
sources when required, such as the US Energy Information Administration, the Energy Council, 
the Eurelectric and the OPTRES forecasts, etc. 
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The objective function computes a supply-demand equilibrium that maximizes net social surplus. 
By giving the model the technology data, the end-use demands, the world crude oil price, the 
supply curves, the emission constraints, and other parameters such as discount rates, time period 
definition and time slice definition, the model will provide the technology investments, 
technology activities, emission trajectories, final fuel market share, adjusted demands, marginal 
energy prices, imports/exports, permit trading, and total system cost, among others. In order to 
provide all that information, the model requires additional tools to support the process. Figure 
5.7. illustrates these additional tools. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Model requirements. 
Source: Gargiulo, M. presentation. VEDA-TIMES Training Course, Lisbon 12-14 December 2012. 
 
The Database and Assumptions are collected in .xls files and are the responsibility of the analyst. 
The Shell tools interpret the data input and output. The Shell interfaced used in this document is 
the VEDA user interface (VEDA-FRONT END and VEDA-BACK END). Then, the model 
generator processes the data files from the model and generates a matrix (GAMS) - mathematical 
programming problem). VEDA-BE collects the results from the model generator and it is used to 
analyze the results. 
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In more detail, VEDA-FE handles the model input data. It has a highly modular design and is 
heavily reliant on flexible excel workbooks integrated with a core database viewable via a 
browser with a navigator to oversee the management of the excel workbooks. It has powerful 
filters and search facilities with Reference Energy Systems (RET) diagramming and 
commodity/process masters with data views. It also incorporates a case manager for composing 
and submitting model runs. 
 
VEDA-BE is a powerful results analysis system with flexible features including the user’s 
definition of sets and tables, unit conversions, dynamic pivot tables (cubes) to visualize the 
model results, grouping tables into reports, exporting the cubes to excel files, and automatic 
updating of workbooks with new model run results. The runs performed for this document using 
VEDA-FE and the results visualized using VEDA-BE can be seen on appendix A. 
 
TIMES systems are very complex model and it required groups of experts in many countries to 
develop them. Intensive training is required to be able to use and understand the TIMES system 
and the VEDA interfaces, as well as to understand and design new scenarios and technologies. 
The author of this document participated in a three days training session on December 12-14, 
2012, at the Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova De Lisboa, in Lisbon, 
Portugal, for this purpose. The three days agenda for this training course can be seen in appendix 
G as well as the Certificate in appendix H. 
 
5.3. Scenarios 
Taking into account the dependence on primary energy sources from external sources, the 
scarcity of fossil resources, the uncertainties about the nuclear future, the potential of RET and 
the maturity of some of these technologies in Spain, three scenarios were defined for this 
document in order to examine the potential of RET to substitute fossil resources for electricity 
generation by 2050. These three scenarios do not represent a perfect final description of the 
Spanish energy/electricity system and will be only used to obtain results and draw preliminary 
conclusions of the situation by 2050. The definitions and assumptions of the three scenarios are 
as follows: 
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Business as Usual (BaU) scenario: 
The base year is 2005 (IEA, Eurostat, and national data) with all considerations of the Spanish 
energy system, including new solar thermo electric plants. 
Nuclear energy: nuclear phase out after the decided decommissioning time of this technology, 
which for Spain it will be around the year 2028 (this technology is not allowed after the life of 
the existing ones). 
Renewables: the support mechanisms modeled are investment subsidies and FIT in Spain. This 
scenario also includes the decision of the Government of Spain in January 2012 to suspend the 
FIT from that moment on. Further explanations about this mechanism are provided in the 
following pages. 
European Union targets:  it enforces the targets for the penetration of RET set by the EU 
(Directive 2009/28/EC), where 20% of the final energy consumption and a 10% of final 
consumption of energy in transport by 2020 have to come from RET. This path is implemented 
as a lower bound in the model solution. Also, the corresponding targets for CO2 emissions in 
2020 are enforced, where they should be 20% below 1990 emissions by 2020. 
Prices of fossil fuels: the prices used are those of the World Energy Outlook 200820, published by 
the IEA in November 2008, and estimated to 100$2007/barrel in 2010. These prices have been 
updated for the 2010 values. 
CO2 tax: the Kyoto targets or the post-Kyoto targets set by the 2007 European Spring Council 
are not imposed as a bound. It is assumed that the current Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
operates at a clearing price of 20euros(2005)/tonCO2 in 2010. For the post-Kyoto period, carbon 
prices increase smoothly to 24euros(2005)/tonCO2 in 2030 and this price applies to the current 
ETS sectors. 
Demographic: the population projection is according to Eurostat. 
Macroeconomic outlook: the GEM-E3 model is used to quantify the national sectorial figures of 
economic and GDP growth. 
                                                 
20
 World Energy Outlook, November 2008, IEA, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ 
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Emissions: only CO2 emissions are taking in mind in the implementation of the emissions limits. 
The approach is that ETS sectors can full trade CO2 emitted, and non-ETS sectors have an 
imposed upper bound in the emissions of CO2 according to the Directive proposal for non-ETS 
emissions. 
All these assumptions remain constant until the end of the modeling period, 205021. 
 
Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) scenario: 
This scenario is based on the same hypotheses as the BaU scenario but with an extension of the 
Spanish FIT for the renewable technologies as described in the PER. The results of this scenario 
will be compared with the results from the BaU scenario. 
 
High Fossil fuel prices (HFOSPRI) scenario:  
This scenario is based on the same hypotheses as the BaU but with an increase in prices of 
imported fuel by 10% of the reference prices as a way to explore energy security scenarios. The 
results of this scenario will be compared with the results from the BaU scenario. 
 
The model follows the FIT program outlined in chapter 3 of this document (also known as the 
PER), and were based on the fact that project developers should choose one of the following 
options (RES2020 2010): 
 
- Transfer electricity to the system through the transport or distribution grid, therefore 
being paid a FIT for it, unique for all the programming periods. 
- Sell the electricity on the wholesale electricity market. In this case, the electricity sale 
price is the hour price resulting in the wholesale market supplemented if any, with a 
premium. In this last case, a new feature is introduced for some technologies, a higher 
and a lower limit (cap and floor). 
 
                                                 
21
 A detailed description of the data and mechanisms using in the model for Spain can be found in the “Reference 
Document on Renewable Energy Sources Policy and Potential” on the RES2020 project website 
(http://www.cres.gr/res2020/).  
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The titleholders of the facilities may choose the most suitable sale options for periods no shorter 
than a year. Nevertheless, the participation in the market is encouraged as it is deemed that in 
this way. Figure 5.8. illustrates the most relevant FIT prices considered in the model. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. FIT values in the model. 
Source: RES2020 (2010). 
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According to RES2020 (2010) the premium to be paid every hour was calculated as follows: 
a) For values of the reference market price plus the reference premium lower or equal to the 
lower limit, the premium value to be paid shall be the difference between the lower limit and the 
daily market hourly price at that hour. 
 
b) For the reference market price values plus the reference premium included between the higher 
and the lower limits, established for a given group or subgroup, the value to be paid shall be the 
reference premium for this group or subgroup, at that hour. 
 
c) For the reference market price values included between the higher limit and minus the 
reference premium and the higher limit, the value of the premium to be paid shall be the 
difference between the higher limit and the reference market price at that hour. 
 
d) For the reference market price values higher or equal to the higher limit, the price of the 
premium to be paid shall be zero at that time. 
 
The amounts of tariffs, premiums, supplements and cap & floor limits will be annually updated 
having the consumer price index (CPI) as a reference minus 0.25 until the 31st of December 
2012 and minus 0.5 since then. 
 
The following chapter will present the results of the runs for the three scenarios, and the analysis 
of these results. 
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6. Results 
This chapter shows the results from the runs made for each of the three different scenarios 
described in chapter 5. The processing time for each scenario took approximately six minutes. A 
graphical description of the process to run the scenarios and display the results can be found in 
appendix A. Also, for a better interpretation of the results, the main technologies of the energy 
system have been coded with the same color for all the results, thus providing consistency in the 
view of these results. The following table illustrates the color coding of the results. 
 
Wind Solar Hydro Ocean Oil Gas Coal Geo Biofuel 
         
Table 6. Color coding for main technologies. 
 
6.1. Primary energy 
 
Figure 6.1 Primary energy consumption in the three scenarios. 
 
The evolution of the total value of the primary energy shows a constant trend of consumption on 
primary energy by 2050 in the three scenarios. The total final primary energy consumption for 
the BaU scenario shows that by 2050 Oil and Coal will be the two alternatives leading the share, 
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followed by Gas. These three alternatives represent more than 78% of the primary energy 
consumption by 2050. Based on this result, the evolution of the primary energy in Spain without 
the FIT incentives (BaU) clearly indicates an increase in coal as the alternative (see appendix B 
for more details). This alternative will be used for electricity generation and will use CCS 
technologies as a reference. This can be seen when looking at the results of the electricity 
generated from fossil fuels. 
 
The results for the FIT scenario show that by 2050 Oil remains as the main source of primary 
energy with 37.72% of the share (see table 6.1. for more details) but in this scenario, the second 
alternative is no longer Coal but Gas, with an important increase in the share, up to 34.98% in 
comparison to the 18.25 % that had under the BaU. Coal becomes a smaller alternative with only 
4.83 % of the share, and allowing Biofuels to become the third alternative of the share. It seems 
strange that reintroduction of the FIT incentive produces tiny increases in RET (mainly bio and 
solar), together with a big switch from coal to gas. The small extra RET is intermittent (solar is, 
but not bio) and requires backup which is provided by gas. This gives added value to gas, which 
tips the economic balance away from coal (with carbon capture) towards gas.  
 
 BaU FIT HFOSPRI 
Biofuels 9.35% 9.97% 10.32% 
Coal 22.65% 4.83% 21.22% 
Gas 18.25% 34.98% 25.56% 
Geo 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
Hydro 1.21% 1.21% 1.22% 
Ocean 0.49% 0.49% 0.50% 
Oil 37.33% 37.72% 30.28% 
Solar 5.18% 5.25% 5.31% 
Wind 5.53% 5.53% 5.59% 
Table 6.1. Share of primary energy per scenario in 2050 
 
In the high fossil fuel price scenario (HFOSPRI), which considers no FIT incentives after 
January 2012 and an increase of fossil prices in 10% cumulative over the period, results indicate 
that Oil decreases to a share of 30.28% of the primary energy consumption in 2050 and Gas and 
Coal remain as second and third alternatives respectively. In the event of an increase of fossil 
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prices, the system reduces the dependency on Oil but it is still dependent on Coal and Gas, with 
the addition of Biofuels in this scenario. 
 
The contribution of RET (mainly Wind and Solar) to the primary energy consumption seems to 
stay constant in the three scenarios. A very slight increase can be observed in the HFOSPRI 
scenario and it is due to the increase of the fossil prices and the need for the system to find 
cheaper alternatives. It does not show, however, a clear intention to switch to RET, in 
comparison to other options such as Coal, Gas or Biofuels. The small increase in RET, in spite of 
very high fossil fuel prices, is due to other constraints in the model that prevented much 
additional RET, and in due to the support that the Government of Spain provides to the 
generation of electricity from domestic coal. 
 
For the three scenarios, the year 2015 seems to be the year when RET begins to have a 
significant share in the primary energy consumption evolution (see figures B.1., B.2. and B.3. on 
appendix B). In terms of the other alternatives, by 2020 under the BaU scenario Coal is 
practically irrelevant until 2035, when it increases again until its share of 22.65% in 2050. This is 
due to the penetration of coal with CCS. This is of special relevance since it means a possible 
competitive alternative to RET, and it can explain the reasons for RET not to share a bigger 
portion in the supply mix. In addition, this CO2 is stored in Spain and the Coal used is not 
national but imported, representing a negative result for the potential of RET. 
 
In the case of the FIT scenario, 2020 is the year when Coal practically disappears from the 
supply mix and keeps that trend until 2050. Gas is the alternative that replaces Coal in the final 
mix. Finally, under the HFOSPRI scenario, the year 2040 seems to be the year when coal is back 
to the mix with CCS, but not as strong as in the BaU scenario, mainly due to the increase of the 
price of fossil fuels enforced in this scenario. Gas begins to increase by 2040 as well, and keeps 
its increase constant up to 2050. 
 
Based on these results, RET seems to be an unclear alternative for any of the scenarios, and not a 
clear alternative to replace fossil fuels by 2050. However, it does show an important increase 
from 2015 to 2050 and become steady for the remaining of the period. This could be interpreted 
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that under a more drastic increase in the price of fossil fuels, RET could be an alternative to 
fossils, but CCS will remain as a competitive alternative to RET. 
 
6.2. Final energy consumption 
 
Figure 6.2. Final energy consumption in the three scenarios. 
 
The evolution of the total values for final energy consumption show a small increase of the FIT 
scenario (over the BaU) and a decrease of the HFOSPRI scenario (compared with the BaU). This 
is probably due to the maintenance of the FIT incentives under the FIT scenario and the 
perception of a reduction in the cost of imported resources, which could lead to an increase in 
consumption. On the other hand, and due to the enforcement of high fossil prices and the 
perception caused by not having incentives to RET, a decrease in consumption could occur. 
 
Transport and Industrial-Energy related sectors represent more than 80% of the consumption in 
the three scenarios. This is in line with all the studies and conclusions outlined in previous 
chapters, and indicate that these two sectors will be the sectors that will need more 
considerations when designing policies for energy efficiency (EE) or savings in energy 
consumption.  
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6.3. Primary energy-Imports 
 
Figure 6.3. Comparison of primary energy import results per scenario in 2050 (PJ) 
 
As an immediate consequence of a situation with steady final energy consumption (previously 
analyzed), imports remain in the same trend as demand (see appendix C for more details), since 
neither energy efficiency nor any other enforcement were considered for the three scenarios. 
Primary energy imports for the BaU represents 81% of the total primary energy by 2050 with Oil 
as the main alternative, followed by Coal and Gas respectively. For the FIT scenario, imports 
represent 80.15% of the total primary energy, with just Oil and Gas as clear alternatives. Under 
the HFOSPRI scenario, imports represent around 74.56% of the total primary energy, proving 
that under a situation with high fossil prices, imports decline. 
 
 BaU FIT HFOSPRI 
Biofuels 7.18% 6.49% 6.70% 
Coal 23.81% 2.49% 15.00% 
Electricity 0.30% 0.31% 0.33% 
Gas 22.56% 43.65% 26.39% 
Oil 46.15% 47.06% 51.57% 
Table 6.2. Share of primary energy imports per scenario in 2050 
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The evolution of imports from 2005 to 2050 also show that 2015 and 2040 are the years when 
both Coal and Gas change their participation in the supply mix. This is consistent with what it 
was seen for the results of primary energy consumption. The evolution of imports per year, as 
well as the final share of each alternative can been seen in appendix C. 
  
6.4. Electricity generation 
 
Figure 6.4. Comparison of electricity generation results per scenario in 2050 (GWh) 
 
The evolution of the total values for electricity generation is not steady for the three scenarios. 
Under the FIT scenario there is an increase in electricity generation, and under the HFOSPRI 
scenario there is a decrease in electricity generation, when compared to the BaU scenario. These 
variations can be related to the cost of electricity during the period of analysis. Under the BaU 
scenario, Wind and Solar represent more than 58% of the total electricity generated, followed by 
Coal with 29.78%. Under the FIT scenario, Wind and Solar represent around 52% followed by 
Gas with 37.89%. Finally, under the HFOSPRI scenario, Wind and Solar represent more than 
60% of the generation mix, followed by Coal with 28.34%. In 2013, the generation of electricity 
from Wind technologies was 19.8%, from Solar PV was 3.1% and Solar Thermoelectric 1.7% 
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(Table 4.4., section 4.2.). This is in line with the analyses for the primary energy consumption 
and proves that by 2050 RET are a real alternative for the Spanish electricity system. It can be 
seen that under the BaU scenario, the non-RET technology to accompany RET in the mix would 
be Coal, whereas with FIT incentives in the system, the chosen non-RET technology would be 
Gas. Under no FIT incentives and with high fossil prices, the chosen technology is Gas, with 
more share for Hydro. Table 6.3. shows the share of electricity generation per scenario in 2050. 
 
 BaU FIT HFOSPRI 
Gas (CHP) 0.80% 0.00% 0.00% 
Coal 29.78% 0.00% 28.34% 
Gas 0.00% 37.89% 0.00% 
Geothermal 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 
Hydro 7.77% 6.92% 8.02% 
Ocean 3.16% 2.83% 3.26% 
Solar 22.94% 20.53% 23.68% 
Wind 35.51% 31.78% 36.66% 
Table 6.3. Share of electricity generation per scenario in 2050 
 
The evolution of electricity generation also shows (see appendix D) the decline of Coal 
generation by 2025 in all scenarios, but a recovery on this technology is due to the introduction 
of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies by 2040 in both the BaU and HFOSPRI 
scenarios. In the same year, both in the FIT and HFOSPRI scenarios, Solar becomes a new 
alternative in the share, whereas Wind is been deployed in all three scenarios. It is not until 2035 
when Solar becomes a key alternative under the BaU scenario. 
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6.5. Electricity generation-fossil resources 
 
Figure 6.5. Comparison of electricity generation from fossil resources results in 2050 
(GWh) 
 
The evolution of the total values for electricity generated from fossil resources by 2050 is in line 
with the total electricity generated. Under the BaU, the generation of electricity from these 
sources represents around 30.58% of the total, 37.89% of the total for the FIT scenario, and 
28.34% of the total under the HFOSPRI scenario. The reference technology under BaU is Coal 
CCS, with almost 98% of the fossil generation, and only 2.62% for Gas (CHP). With FIT 
incentives in place, 100% of the generation of electricity from fossil resources comes from Gas 
plants by 2050, and under high fossil prices, the chosen alternatives is Coal CCS by 2050. Table 
6.4. shows the share of electricity generated from fossil resources per scenario in 2050. 
 
 BaU FIT HFOSPRI 
Coal CCS 97.38% - 100.00% 
Coal  - - - 
Gas - 100.00% - 
Gas (CHP) 2.62% - 
 
Table 6.4. Share of electricity generation from fossil resources per scenario in 2050 
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The year 2020 can be seen as the year of change in all three scenarios. This makes sense due to 
the enforcement of the EU targets by 2020. Under the BaU scenario, 2020 is the year when 
almost all electricity generated from fossil resources is produced from Gas plants and it is not 
until 2040 when Coal CCS penetrates into the mix and displaces Gas by 2050. Under the FIT 
scenario, 2020 becomes the year when Gas plants are the main source of electricity from fossil 
resources, and remains in this position until 2050. Finally, under the HFOSPRI scenario, it is 
again 2020 the year when Gas plants are the main producers of electricity under this category. 
But it is in 2035, earlier than in the BaU scenario, and due to the increase of prices in fossil 
resources, when Coal CCS enters the generation mix, displacing Gas plants completely by 2050. 
(see appendix E). 
 
It can be seen that the suspension of FIT incentives did not affect or impact in great detail the 
final generation mix in 2050. However, it did contribute to support one or another selected 
alternative technology, whereas under a non-FIT situation (BaU and HFOSPRI scenarios) the 
chosen technology was Coal CCS, representing a threat to RET, or under a FIT scenario, the 
chosen technology was Gas. 
 
In any case, if RET were to replace the technologies that use fossil resources, under a non-FIT 
situation, the amounts of electricity to be replaced would be approximately 128,000 GWh, and 
under a FIT and high fossil prices would be approximately 177,000 GWh and 115,000 GWh 
respectively. 
  
6.6. CO2 emissions 
CO2 emissions under the three scenarios remain substantially high, with the FIT scenario being 
the least CO2 emitter of the three. This is in line with all the analyses performed in this chapter 
since both the BaU and the HFOSPRI scenarios consider Coal as an alternative for both primary 
energy and electricity generation. It has already been explained that for Spain to meet the Kyoto 
targets, the only way was to buy carbon credits from other surrounding countries. In addition, the 
only reason why Spain reduced the emission of CO2 was because of the economic crisis that 
affected the country (section 4.2.). The CO2 emission trend based on the results of this model 
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show that CO2 emissions will be in the order of 415-430 MtCO2 unless a FIT plan is deployed, 
more strategies of the penetration of RET are design, or other alternatives such as CCS are in 
place during the period of the analysis. It can also be seen that the two main CO2 emission 
sectors are the Transport and Industrial sectors, with a relaxation on these values under the 
HFOSPRI scenario, due mainly to the increase in the prices of these resources (see appendix F). 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Comparison of CO2 emissions before CCS results per scenario in 2050 
(MtCO2) 
 
6.7. Summary 
In the BaU scenario, primary energy (PE) was dominated by Oil, followed by Coal, Gas and 
Biofuels. PE imports was dominated by Oil (46%), Coal (24%), and Gas (23%). For the 
generation of electricity, electricity generation was led by Wind (35%), followed by Coal (30%) 
and Solar PV (23%), and electricity generated from fossil fuels was dominated by Coal CCS 
(96%). CO2 emissions were of the order of 418.98 MtCO2. 
 
In the FIT scenario, PE was dominated by Oil (38%) and Gas (35%) with an important reduction 
of Coal (5%). PE imports were dominated by Oil (47%), and Gas (44%). Electricity generation 
was led by Gas (38%) and Wind (32%), followed by Solar (20%) and Hydro (7%), and the 
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electricity generated from fossil fuels was 100% produced from Gas. CO2 emissions were of the 
order of 348.73 MtCO2, a reduction of around 16.79% from the BaU. 
In the HFOPRI scenario, PE was dominated by Oil (30%) and Gas (26%) and Coal (21%), and 
PE imports were dominated by Oil (51%), Gas (26%) and Coal (15%). The generation of 
electricity was led by Wind (37%) and Coal (28%), followed by Solar (24%) and Hydro (8%). 
Electricity generated from fossil fuels was 100% produced from Coal CCS. CO2 emissions were 
of the order of 431.51MtCO2, around 3% more than the BaU scenario. 
 
RET behaviour in the three scenarios 
 
It can be noted that RET (mainly wind and solar) behaves in similar ways in the scenarios. This 
is probably due to the restrictions in the model related to the technical potential of each 
technology. Each technology has a limit that cannot be surpassed (in terms of energy produced) 
and they are specific for each country (in this case for Spain). For instance, for the RET 
behaviour in the three scenarios, these limits are related to the localization of facilities (using 
GIS information), wind data, irradiation (for Solar PV), and that they have exhausted the best 
available wind land resources, among others. Therefore the model chooses from other 
alternatives. In addition, the model uses, among other parameters, the predefined capacity factors 
per technology to choose between the best and the more efficient options. 
 
The increase in demand in the FIT scenario is probably due to environmental constraints. These 
constraints allow gas to be chosen as an alternative technology under the FIT scenario. This also 
implies that with fewer emissions the electricity generated is “cleaner” and the model chooses to 
shift from energy produced with coal to electricity from renewable and gas, especially in the 
industry sector. This can be understood when under the FIT scenario, the model chooses the 
most efficient and cleaner alternatives such as electric ovens and generators; and therefore 
increasing electricity demand. The model does not look at where the monetary resources for a 
FIT incentive comes from; this is not consider from the demand side since the model does look 
at the overall cost of the system and not at who it affects. With this in mind, it can be argued that 
these constraints on RET could be violated in the real world but only if the technical potential is 
improved. Therefore, if RET had the potential to replace the technologies that use fossil 
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resources, the amounts of electricity to be replaced would be approximately 128,000 GWh 
(BaU), 177,000 GWh (FIT) and 115,000 GWh (HFOSPRI), although even more fossil fuels than 
the model suggests could be replaced by RET. 
If the worst case scenario was to be considered, 177,000 GWh would be used to analyse the 
potential of RET. With the possibility of violating in the real world the constraints mentioned 
earlier, the following considerations would apply: 
 
With capacity factors of 24.06% for Wind, 19.96% for Solar TE, 18.51% for Solar PV, and 
17.46% for minihydro, and considering that Wind represents 19.80% of the total electricity 
generated in the Spanish system in 2013, Solar PV represented 3.10%, Minihydro represented 
2.6% and Solar TE represented 1.70%, a preliminary total amount of capacity to be installed by 
2050 using these four technologies would be of the order of around 90,840MW, where Wind 
technology would need around 61,100MW installed, Solar PV would need around 12,440MW 
installed, Minihydro technology would need around 11,000MW installed, and Solar TE would 
need an additional 6,300MW installed. 
 
However, although the nature of RET resources could be considered unlimited, they are limited 
by technical potential and unless these limitations are overcome, the replacement of 100% by 
RET will not be possible. Large improvements in the efficiency of RET technologies through the 
capacity factor of each RET technology will be needed in order to replace the generation of 
electricity from fossil resources by RET by 100%. This will be one of the few options, since in 
Spain, the availability for the best land has already been exhausted. 
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7. Analysis 
This chapter continues with the analysis of the Spanish electricity system from the perspective of 
the evolution of the PER and the electricity system in order to complement the analysis of the 
period under description (2005-2050). First, a review of the evaluation report of the PER carried 
out by the Government of Spain will be discussed. This information will be combined with a 
more comprehensive analysis of the current situation of the Spanish electricity system, including 
the tariff deficit, influences of corporations and politicians, and the CO2 emissions, among 
others. 
 
7.1. Analysis of the PER 
The objective of the evaluation report (AEVAL 2011) was to determine the degree of 
implementation and success achieved in the execution of the PER’s objectives. The evaluation 
aimed to consider the peculiarities of the different dimensions and levels involved in the 
promotion of renewable energies such as the European dimension (EU Directives), the national 
dimension (the Government of Spain as being the one in charge of the planning), the provincial 
dimension (the AACC had the competences to authorize the RET installations) and the local 
dimension (they could/couldn’t the installation of generation facilities from RET). 
 
According to the report, one of the most complex issues for the evaluation process was to 
establish a clear way to unify the results. The data was so disperse and sometimes not available 
until the end of the period. The unsustainability of the energy existing model based on fossil 
fuels dependency was at the heart of the development of the PER. The transition to an energy 
model more energetic, environmentally and economically sustainable required the definition of 
different supply and demand policies as well as new technologies based on the use of RET with 
new generation, distribution, transmission and consumption guidelines, that were less wasteful 
and more efficient. 
 
The PER had three main targets and only one was fulfilled, and not to the full extent. Analysis 
and evaluations of the results have shown the complexity of the deployment of these kind of 
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plans and the evidence that there is still much to do in terms of RET, not only in Spain but 
elsewhere. The efficiency of the public aids – mainly the premiums by unit of installed power – 
indicated that the less was the index the more was the efficiency. The thermoelectrical area 
proved to be the most efficient. The economic yield of the premiums had undergone remarkable 
variations from the 27 euros per KW of the hydro to the 413 euros of the photovoltaic. 
 
Based on the results of the PER for primary energy, at a hypothetical five years period path set 
by the PER, the European directive target22 could have been met. Unfortunately, and after the 
decision of the Government of Spain (January 2012) to suspend the premiums for RET projects 
in an attempt to cut the nation’s budget deficit (the tariff deficit), and after the analysis of the 
three scenarios in the model, this target will not be met unless other type of incentives are 
designed and properly implemented. 
 
The great differences in investments and premiums cashed between different RET were never 
addressed in the PER. The plan allowed that Solar PV installations represented 94% of the total 
RET recorded and 67.5% of the total premium cashed during the period 2005-2010. By 
reviewing the results and the current data, targets were met to some degree by putting large 
amounts of resources (mainly monetary) into the lower capacity factor technological areas and 
development (i.e. Solar PV). Figure 7.1. illustrates the unbalanced achievement of installed 
capacity based on the targets of the PER. (see chapter 3 for more details). 
                                                 
22
 For Spain, the path for the renewable energy targets stated with a share of 8.7% in 2005, and a growth to 11% in 
2011-2012, 12.1% in 2013-2014, 13.8% in 2015-2016, 16% in 2017-2018, and 20% in 2020. 
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Figure 7.1. Expected and real installed capacity of the PER. 
Source: Adapted from AEVAL (2011). 
 
The public aids system used in the PER demonstrated its effectiveness with respect to other 
stimulus tools and systems in other countries. It seems adequate that the premiums have 
facilitated the creation of a flow of income/returns on the generation side that contributed to the 
amortization of investments with sufficiently positive results for the adequate repayment of the 
yield expectations from the investors. However, this is only valid for the wind, Solar PV and 
thermoelectrical areas. 
 
When the results are evaluated from the performance of the overall system, the PER created huge 
inequities across technology sectors; wind versus solar, and so on. For a technology like Solar 
PV, with a lower capacity factor, around 18%, and high levelized cost, around 420 euros/MWh, 
its impact on the overall energy mix was trivial and it came at a very large cost. This situation 
drove down more promising options that could have achieved its fuller potential but it could not 
be done due to the tax and financial incentive, that were so heavily targeted on one technology to 
another. 
 
0 360 450
973 722
0
12,000
363 94 5000 192 173 188 0 0
12,426
3,749
59
632
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
M
W
Expected versus Real installed capacity (2005-2010)
Expected increase
Real increase
96 
The PER did not reflect the value (real) to the consumer and to the system. When looking at the 
performance of a system, using appropriate methodologies to evaluate the cost and benefits of 
RET is more efficient than allocating large monetary resources into the system. Questions arising 
as a result of this could be related to questioning what could have happened if the same amount 
of these resources would have been allocated in other RET with different capacity factors and 
levelized costs (see Tables 4.6. and 4.7. for a comparison of these values in the Spanish 
electricity market). These questions were not clearly analyzed nor considered in the design and 
deployment of the PER. The political game could have been to assume that capacity factors are 
high in order to drive down the advertised levelized cost, so it can be more competitive than it 
actually is. 
 
According to Joskow (2010) solar technology may have a higher levelized cost than wind 
technology, but it may produce much more valuable electricity (during peak time); arguing that 
levelized costs calculations might hide important factors. Paying less for a project that only 
supplies power during off peak periods could be a very inefficient choice if a more costly 
alternative when a more economically attractive output profile is available. Traditional levelized 
cost comparisons fail to consider that the value to the system varies widely over the course of the 
year thus appropriate methods to evaluate the costs and benefits of renewable generating 
technologies should be assessed for future PER plans. 
 
Calculations of Pearson correlation for wind contribution to demand during the most electricity 
demanding month (February 2012) showed that almost half of the month were negative 
correlation of around -0.7 factor, indicating that energy from wind was not produced at the time 
it was needed. (Appendix I contains the data for these calculations and data for the month of 
February 2012). 
 
The argument of the Government of Spain to suspend premiums in order to reduce the tariff 
deficit is not easy to understand since there was no clear relationship between one and the other. 
Saenz de Miera et al. (2008) argued that renewables are expensive but failing to consider the 
social benefits provided by electricity from RET, including environmental and socioeconomic 
ones. Their study pointed out that there is another neglected benefit: the reduction in the 
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wholesale price of electricity as a result of more electricity from RET being fed into the grid. 
This also indicates that the increase in the cost of electricity from RET support may be offset by 
the short/medium term reduction in the wholesale price, leading to a reduction of retail electricity 
prices, which does not seem to happen in the Spanish market. 
 
But this benefit does not seem to pass along to consumers nor to the system’s value. This could 
be a result of what it was proved by Linares et al. (2008) where the Spanish market was a 
concentrated market, with two large firms covering almost 80% of the generation market and 
only four more other small firms with only some generation capacity. 
 
This supports the idea that any plan, model or quantitative prediction should always consider 
aspects such as the strategies of dominant firms and the level of public support for RET. 
Therefore, these two aspects will be critical in any future development of a RET plan. 
 
Substituting natural gas by RET will imply a substantial saving and benefits due to increases of 
the price of this resource. With the initial goal of saving money in the national budget (by 
suspending the premium to RET) consumers will be paying more, through the electricity bill, and 
to countries and firms that do not invest in Spain nor looking into the best value for the system 
and the consumer. Former executives of the Spanish Energy Secretariat already admitted that the 
tariff deficit debt to the electricity generators will take 20 to 30 years to be paid off, and it will be 
the next generations who will pay for it23. It seems that Spain is not only locked into a very 
expensive form of electricity generation, but has put the country in a trajectory that there is no 
easy exit. 
 
Although the deployed investment of the plan surpassed the forecast, great differences between 
different technological areas were observed. While the co-combustion area had 0% of 
development, the Solar PV area reached an annual percentage of almost 1000% (in 2007). It is 
necessary to remember that the plan was not provided with review mechanisms based on the 
degree of fulfillment of the targets (AEVAL 2011). This mechanism would have allowed the 
correcting of excesses before it happened, as the case of Solar PV, where Solar PV installations 
                                                 
23
 http://www.abc.es/economia/20130507/abci-deficit-tarifa-explicacion-201305061845.html 
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represented 94% of the total registered RET producers, and 67.5% of the total premiums cashed 
in the period of the plan. 
The plan’s capacity to attract investments could be considered a success for technologies such as 
Solar PV, biofuels, biogas, wind, thermoelectric and hydro (for more than 10MW), and a failure 
for the mini-hydro, solar thermoelectric and in particular, biomass.  
 
A further analysis of the review of the evaluation report indicated that the implementation of the 
PER was difficult in its deployment due to a lack of articulation between supply and demand 
offers in designing, implementing and monitoring, and between the public agents involved in its 
management and implementation. The analysis of the results indicated that the plan was 
conceived as a Governmental commitment and designed as a national policy. Thus, the real 
implementation of the plan happened to be more a departmental deployment than a national 
program probably due to the limitations in departmental competencies. This same limitation was 
identified within the intervention of the Autonomous Communities (AACC) in areas such as the 
industrial developments, territory zoning or local energy policies (AEVAL 2011). 
 
Based on the analysis of the targets, the PER did not consider in depth the penetration of RET in 
other sectors such as transportation, domestic and services neither the difficulties to penetrate 
RET in these sectors. The initial design of the objectives was based on a period of time that 
considered the maturity of some technologies but, as results showed, not all technologies 
matured at the same pace. The time frame of the PER should have considered the maturity of 
technologies and perhaps this time frame should have been extended or reduced based on the 
evolution of the technologies. 
 
During the period of the PER, the evaluation report (AEVAL 2011) considered other important 
aspects: 
 
• There was a lack of coordination between the AACC, the National administration, and 
the Regulator agents. 
• The PER was configured as an aids plan and system rather than an “integral” RET plan. 
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• There was a huge unbalanced commitment between sector’s departments in the 
definition, fulfillment and monitoring of the objectives and measures of the PER. 
• The initial planning process had little or none external participation and lack of debate 
about the contents of the PER. 
• The PER did not have any information and participation mechanisms neither 
accountability mechanisms. This reflected a lack of accountability to the society in 
general. 
• Absence of commitment in the PER, clearly identified due to the absence of territorial 
targets. 
• Lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanism in place for the follow up of the targets. 
• Lack of appropriate indicators associated to the development of each type of energy 
source in order to observe the evolution of the implementation of the RET. 
• The National administration lacked on necessary resources to be able to stop irregularities 
in time. 
• The PER was conditioned by permanent activities incorporating regulations that have 
altered the plan’s objectives (around 30 Royal Decrees were passed in the period of the 
PER). 
 
The economic impact measured in terms of GDP growth and job creation was described by the 
report as positive. In terms of job creation, 50% of jobs were created within the wind energy 
area, followed by far by the Solar PV area, and even further, by the solar thermoelectric. 
 
The results for R&D impact considered in the PER shown an evolution of inventions and patents 
related to RET, and presented a spectacular increase, especially in the areas of wind and solar 
PV, being registered primarily by companies. It is a believed that there is still room for 
innovation in the fields of the third generation of wind turbine generators, large scale storage 
technologies, distributed generation systems, and smart grids technologies. 
 
Finally, the environmental impacts of the PER were associated to the CO2 emissions avoided by 
the installation of RET. This measure was fulfilled by the plan’s objectives since the avoided 
amount of CO2 emissions was about 93.6 MtCO2. 
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7.2. Understanding the Spanish electricity system 
After reviewing and analyzing the results of the latest RET plan in Spain (the PER) it is 
worthwhile to analyze the current situation of the Spanish electricity system based on the 
information provided in chapter 4. 
 
The first thing to consider in the Spanish electricity system is the uncontrolled investment in new 
generation plants. As shown in figures 4.7. and 4.9. (chapter 4), the generation of electricity 
using natural gas (combine cycle) was declining while the special regime (renewable and 
cogeneration) continued to grow. Also, the electricity companies continued to construct gas-fired 
stations at the same time as wind farms and solar thermoelectric plants during the same period. in 
In recent years, and as seen in chapter 4, only gas stations, wind farms, solar PV farms 
(especially after 2007) and solar thermoelectric plants (especially after 2009) were built while 
the tip (peak demand) of the system (the parameter that should guide the investment in new 
plants) was constant for six years. Figure 7.2. shows the maximum hourly and daily demand in 
Spain for the last five years. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Maximum hourly and daily demands in Spain. 
Source: REE (2013). 
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Since the process of liberalisation of the market began in 1998 (see chapter 2 for more details), 
the wholesale market rules remained unchanged. As previously discussed, the cornerstone of the 
the electricity market, is the "pool" where all the vendors and buyers come to negotiate up to 7 
times a day the energy for every hour. The market operator, OMEL, adds the curves for supply 
and demand and calculates the price that corresponds to each hour, that is, for the entire market, 
the most expensive offer needed to meet demand (marginal market). In practice, even at times of 
higher demand (as shown in the figure below which corresponds to one day in winter), most of 
the energy is acceptance-price, in both the supply and the demand side, so just a few power 
plants set the price for the entire market. 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Supply and demand aggregated curves. 
Source: OMEL (2011). 
 
According to Morales (2011), demand is acceptance-price because it is inelastic. The acceptance-
price offer has its origin in nuclear power plants (which for these plants is cheaper to produce at 
any price than to stop) and in special regime facilities, mainly wind farms, solar and 
cogeneration plants, which are forced to offer at zero price. 
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Demand coverage for the previous situation indicated that only around 30% of the generation 
came from gas stations, which are the ones where agents can operate with a higher degree of 
competition. This shows that power plants that were built in a fully regulated system in which 
there was no competition, are not benefiting from liberalised prices that are much higher than 
what was guaranteed when they were built. This situation applies mainly to nuclear and large 
hydroelectric dams. The market signal is inefficient for these technologies simply because there 
is no agent that can construct similar plants in order to compete. 
 
According to data from the Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum (2008)  "in Spain the operating cost 
for generating the nuclear kWh generation has remained stable, reaching a value of 12.9 euros 
per net MWh, of which 9.5 euros correspond to the costs of operation and maintenance, and 3.4 
euros per MWh to the cost of the fuel". The price of the pool in Spain has been around 45 
euros/MWh in recent years. Ignoring the payments for capacity that nuclear plants receive, 
which in 2010 was an additional 3 euros/MWh and subtracting from this value the 12.9 
euros/MWh of cost, margins of around 35 euros/MWh are obtained, which would have been 
used to finance the investment. The average margin is 2,000 million euros24 annually, which 
divided by the installed nuclear power, provides an annual margin of around 0.25 million 
euros/MW. 
 
According to the Forum, the cost of investment for a new generation nuclear plant is about 3 
million euros/MW. Therefore, at the current rate, a new nuclear plant would be amortized in a 
period of about 12 years. Taking into account that the Spanish nuclear system has an average life 
time of 25 years, it is surprising that the electricity generation companies intend to argue that the 
plants are not yet depreciated. It can be seen then that, without taking into consideration other 
externalities, the construction of new nuclear plants under the current market model would not 
lead to a lower cost to the consumer, but to an increase in the benefits of its promoters. 
 
Regarding large hydroelectric power plants, its use as a large scale energy storage is crucial for 
the setting of the market price. Since their ownerships are highly concentrated in just a few 
companies, its market influence is very high (Morales 2011). 
                                                 
24
 Based on data from OMEL, REE and the Nuclear Forum. 
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Through discussions within this document , it was noted that these technologies had over costs 
for the last decade of more than 39,000 million euros in premium to the generation from RET, 
and more than 39,000 million euros in investments. In addition to these over costs, the current 
pool had a second effect: RET were favouring significant drops in prices which, paradoxically, 
translated into an increase of these over costs that then customer perceives. 
 
RET produced savings to the electricity system of 6,576 million euros, 620 million higher than 
the premiums received by its generation of electricity. If these savings were not taken into 
account, the tariff deficit at the end of 2012 could have been of 5,639 million euros higher than 
the current situation. In addition, RET avoided the importation of 13.480.857 toe of fossil fuels, 
with economic savings equivalent to 2,429 million euros in 2012, and avoided the emission into 
the atmosphere of 36.7 MtCO2, producing a savings of 270,8 million euros. The reduction in the 
cost of energy in the daily market (OMEI) due to the penetration of RET, was 4,056 million 
euros (APPA 2012). 
 
However, RET are largely subsided and all facilities, regardless of its remuneration scheme, sell 
its power in the pool (offered at zero price) and subsequently they deal with the CNE (depending 
on their corresponding remuneration scheme) to get paid whether the difference between the set 
tariff and what they have gained in the pool (the so-called equivalent premium), or the premium. 
Therefore, the lower the market price is the higher the RET over costs are (the sum of premium 
and equivalent premiums) that the market perceives. While the volume of RET was small, its 
influence on the pool price was minimal; but with this changing situation, the influence is 
obviously very different. 
 
The coal mining industry has been considered strategic in Spain for a long time and enjoys a 
great social impact, employing around 8,800 workers. Since 2010, utilities have been generating 
electricity from natural gas and not from coal since gas is more profitable and therefore more 
natural gas capacity has been installed. As an immediate consequence, they stopped buying 
domestic coal, which had a strong social impact in the areas of extraction. The solution adopted 
by the Ministry of Industry was to establish a new concept in the wholesale price of electricity 
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called "technical restriction for security of supply"25 that is paid by all consumers. In practice, a 
selling price has been set for all coal plants so that if the pool does not reach the price, deficit is 
compensated. The measure has been justified by the need to secure an indigenous energy supply, 
which is contradictory with the decision to extract coal, reducing its strategic reserve nature. 
 
Nevertheless, the main problem of the electricity system in Spain is the so-called "tariff deficit", 
which is currently of more than 27,000 million euros. Its origins are very simple: the political 
inconvenience of applying the increases in the costs of the electricity services to end customers. 
The Government of Spain has acknowledged that the electricity bill has increased by more than 
71% over the last 11 years26 and yet these increases have not been enough to cover the regulated 
costs of the system. The following figure shows the evolution of the tariff deficit. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Evolution of the tariff deficit in Spain (2013). 
Source: MIEYT (2013). 
 
In order to prevent the bankruptcy of the system, the difference between revenue and recognised 
costs has been long-term funded (more than 10 years). In order to reduce the complete deficit, an 
increase of 68% in the end customer prices would be required if the deficit would be liquidated 
in a single year. Quotas to meet long-term financing are already about 10% of the costs of the 
                                                 
25
 http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2010-3158 
26
 http://www.elconfidencial.com/empresas/2013-09-18/el-gobierno-admite-que-el-recibo-de-la-luz-aumento-un-71-
en-la-ultima-decada_29569/ 
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service in Spain. The deficit problem has worsened during recent years due to the difficulties of 
financing it in international markets, so it has remained in the balance of the electricity 
companies. The endorsement of the State was required in order to securitize this debt and move 
it in international markets (started in 2011) (Matea Rosa 2013). 
 
As far as recognized costs, there are two main components: the price of energy and the tolls. 
While the price of energy is set by the market, the tolls are decided administratively. The price of 
energy is the result of free negotiation between the ones selling the energy (the producers) and 
those who buy it (commercialization companies and direct consumers). 
 
This market has rules that are supposed to ensure the transparency and independence of those 
acting. However, it is subject to strong distortions, which makes the resulting price not 
credible27. For instance, some producers offer their energy at prices that do not include all the 
costs28. Another problem for the market is that some of the companies that sell and buy energy 
are the same (the big electrical five members of Unesa), giving them a competitive edge and 
market power, resulting in prices beneficial to the interests of its parent company. 
 
In addition, the aggravating factor seems to be that large buyers are those five companies in their 
role of last resort tariff commercials, who have to sell their electricity at the price of the last 
resort tariff that is set by the Government. That tariff, which electricity companies considered 
insufficient as long as the tariff deficit exits, has the price of energy as one of its two main 
components the price of the energy resulting from the market in which those same companies 
have so much influence. 
 
If changes to the tolls were to be reduced, there are many concepts on which to act. In doing so, 
it would have to take into account the extent to each of those costs, as well as the returns to 
society, both economic and others. In the case of the RET charges, the incentives received are 
justified, among other reasons, by the need, as indicated by the European and international 
                                                 
27
 http://www.libremercado.com/2013-12-20/la-factura-de-la-luz-bajaria-hasta-un-65-eliminando-los-costes-
politicos-1276506940/ 
28
 http://www.europapress.es/economia/energia-00341/noticia-economia-energia-ceaccu-dice-invalidacion-subasta-
electrica-pone-evidencia-manipulacion-precio-20131220135103.html 
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commitments, to promote new technologies that do not emit CO2, or escalating nuclear danger, 
or increasing the external dependency. 
 
However, the last reform of the Government of Spain (July 2013) to solve the deficit was not 
only left in an increase in prices: it abolished the "special regime" and added retroactive effects 
with seemingly discriminatory measures, virtually ending with the Spain branding for RET. This 
reform did not address the real problems and contributed to more confusion. It can be argued that 
the problem was not the RET but the premium.  
 
The Royal Decree 9/2013, acknowledged that this rise of the premium has soared as a result of 
that "during the first quarter of 2013 have been a series of events that have changed the 
assumptions on which the forecasts was done"29. Apparently, the premium increase could be due 
to the errors in the Government forecast. These deviations, always according to the Government, 
were motivated by the fact that atypical weather conditions occurred in the first months of 2013. 
This situation created a collapse in the price of the daily market up to minimum levels of 18.17 
euros/MWh in April, resulting in an average 37 euros/MWh in the first six months of 2013 
which did not reach the expected 51,19 euros/MWh. Therefore, the market failed to reward RET 
with 51,19euros/MWh and only paid 18.17 euros/MWh30. Since the premium is the difference 
between the market price and the supplement that is paid within the fee to pay the price of RET, 
the tariff deficit seems to be a “forecasted problem” and therefore could be seen more as an 
accounting problem, rather than an economic problem. 
 
The tariff deficit was created by the regulator, both PP and PSOE political parties, which is the 
entity who decides what costs should be regulated and how. The tariff deficit is still growing 
because the regulator seems to want to continue subsidizing natural gas, for instance. The 
Secretary of State for energy, Mr. Alberto Nadal, confirmed in July 201331 that combined cycles 
will continue receiving the so-called investment incentives (non-recovery grants) during the next 
20 years at a rate of 10,000 euros per installed megawatt per year. The PSOE established the 
                                                 
29
 http://blogs.lavanguardia.com/diario-de-futuro/las-energias-renovables-el-chivo-expiatorio-del-deficit-de-tarifa-
60414 
30http://www.nuevatribuna.es/opinion/ladislao-martinez/ha-resuelto-ahora-problema-deficit-
tarifario/20130724112047095040.html 
31
 http://www.energias-renovables.com/articulo/quien-tiene-la-culpa-del-deficit-20130715 
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incentive in 2007 (20,000 euros per megawatt per year and for ten years) and PP, although it 
extends the term of the payment, respects the amount carefully. This represented more than 
2,500 million euros in the last five years that electricity companies perceived to build the plants, 
not by the kW to be generated in the future (RET get paid per kilowatt generated; gas gets paid 
just to be there). 
 
The tariff deficit is still growing because the regulator allowed the large electricity companies to 
get 3,000 million euros via the CTC process and none of the Ministers and officials involved 
(Mr. Sebastian, Mr. Soria and Mr. Nadal) were unwilling to claim the refund of that amount. 
 
The tariff deficit seems to be consented because the regulator does not seem to want to contain 
the profits that the large electricity corporations obtain with nuclear and hydroelectric generation, 
and does not seem to want to change them into the reasonable profits that RET have been 
imposed by successive regulations, therefore balancing the structural deficit evaluated at around 
4,500 million euros for 2013. For the last five years, and due to the market rules being 
accommodated to the large electricity companies, nuclear and hydroelectric generation have 
obtained returns of up to 2,200%. This surplus was identified as more than 14,000 million euros 
in the five-year period 2008-2012. 
 
Reactions to these markets situations have happened from different stakeholders but with no 
reaction from the regulator. For instance, the CNE warned the Governments in more than 14 
reports of the 'holes' distorting auctions that the system did not work and it was essential to 
correct it. Minority political groups have submitted proposals to investigate the privatization 
process of the electricity sector which occurred during the first PP Government (1996-2000). 
Sadly enough, in July 2013, 300 of the 323 Members of Congress did not vote in favor for a 
proposal by another minority political group to carry out an energy audit to the energy system 
and the electricity companies in order to find out how much each concept of the electricity bill 
was related to and where they can save money to consumers. Although voting against this 
proposal, some Members of Congress acknowledged that "the problem of the deficit is in the 
regulation and not in the generation" [ergo not in RET]32. 
                                                 
32
 http://www.energias-renovables.com/articulo/trescientos-diputados-paralizan-la-auditoria-energetica-20130703 
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The latest events occurred in December 2013 in the Spanish electricity market were: 
 
• The electricity bill in Spain will increase by a total of 2.3% by January 1st, 2014. 
• The association of consumers denounced the Government in Brussels for breaching the 
European electricity directive. 
• The Government suspended the implementation of the CESUR auction due to "atypical 
circumstances" in the auctioning prices, in order to avoid an increase of 11% in the 
electricity bill and to “work on a new system of pricing the energy”. 
• The Spanish High Tribunal supports that the deficit tariff has to be financed temporally 
by the five members of Unesa. 
 
For CO2 emissions, the energy sector is primary responsible for almost all the emissions, which 
accounted for 78% of the total in 2012. The most important emissions are due to electricity 
generation and road transport. The rest corresponds to ten oil refineries, energy consumption of 
industry, air transport, and residential uses and services (especially heating and domestic hot 
water) (BP Chair 2012). 
 
Emissions from electricity generation grew by 25.4% between 1990 and 2012, representing 
23.5% of the total in 2012, still in the electricity sector where there are more possibilities of 
reducing emissions and at a lower cost. Renewable energies in Spain have prevented the issuance 
of 38 million tons of CO2, and about 200 million tonnes of CO2 over the period 2008-2012 in 
2012. -Primarily wind power - renewable energy contribution to this result of emission reduction 
is very important, as they covered 31.2% of electricity generation in 2012, well above what 
brought nuclear. On the opposite side, the generation of electricity is coal, which grew 35.2% in 
2012, and that explains the increase of emissions in the sector of electricity generation of 8 
million tons of CO2 in 2012 compared to 2011 (REE 2012). It was estimated that this increase 
was due to the decree which promotes the consumption of coal and low prices of CO2 emissions 
in 2012. The following table shows the CO2 emissions in Spain for the last four years as a 
consequence of the electricity system. 
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 MtCO2 Variation from previos year 
2013 61.4 - 23.1% 
2012  80 + 10% 
2011 73 + 25% 
2010 58 - 21% 
Table 7.1. CO2 emissions from the Spanish electricity sector 
Source: Adapted from REE (2013) 
 
Finally, the following table summarizes some key values that could be used to define the Spanish 
electricity and energy systems. 
 
 Value Units Source 
CO2 emissions from Energy Sector (2012) 264 MtCO2 BP 
CO2 emissions from Electricity sector (2013) 61.4 MtCO2 REE 
Dependency from external sources (2012) 84.3 % - MIEYT/BP 
Cost of electricity – Households (2012) 0.177 kWh EUROSTAT 
Cost of electricity – Industrial (2012) 0.116 kWh EUROSTAT 
Increase of cost of electricity (2003-2012) 71 % - GOS33 
Total installed capacity (2013) 108,148 MW REE 
Installed capacity RET (2013) 50,689 (46.87%) MW REE 
Installed capacity Wind (2013) 22,900 (21.17%) MW REE 
Installed capacity Solar PV (2013) 4,681 (4.33%) MW REE 
Installed capacity Solar Thermoelectric (2013) 2,300 (2.13%) MW REE 
Total net electricity generation (2013) 273,598 GWh REE 
Total Wind electricity generation (2013) 54,301 (19.8%) GWh REE 
Total Solar PV electricity generation (2013) 8,397 (3.1%) GWh REE 
Total Solar thermoelectric (2013) 4,554 (1.7%) GWh REE 
Average Capacity Factor Wind (2005-2013) 24.06% - Adapted from REE 
Average Capacity Factor Solar PV (2005-2013) 18.51% - Adapted from REE 
Average Capacity Factor Solar Thermoelectric 
(2008-2013) 19.96% - 
Adapted 
from REE 
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Annual coverage demand – Wind (2012) 18.1% - REE 
Annual coverage demand – Solar (2012) 2.9% - REE 
Peak demand (2012) 43,010 MW REE 
Contribution of RET to peak demand – Wind 
(2012) 20.9% - REE 
Investment in RET (PER 2005-2010) 39,237 Million euros AEVAL 
Premium to RET (2005-2012) 39,656 Million euros CNE, DIE
34
, 
MIEYT 
Wind installed capacity by the PER 12,426 MW AEVAL 
Solar PV installed capacity by the PER 3,749 MW AEVAL 
Total electricity generated by the PER (2010) 34,340 GWh AEVAL 
Wind electricity generated by the PER (2010) 24,137 (70.28%) GWh AEVAL 
Solar PV electricity generated by the PER 
(2010) 6,261 (18.23%) GWh AEVAL 
Tariff deficit (cumulative to 2013) 26,759 Million euros MIEYT 
Tariff deficit (annual) 4,000 – 5,000 Million euros MIEYT 
Base load price for electricity – annual pool 
(2013) 44,64 euro/MWh OMEL 
Peak load price for electricity – annual pool 
(2013) 51,94 euro/MWh OMEL 
Table 7.2. Values for the Spanish electricity and energy systems (2012-2013) 
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8. Conclusions and recommendations 
8.1. Conclusions 
It is clear that Spain is in a transition stage in the history of RET support. As well, the history of 
the Spanish electricity system suggests the need for a new era of conceiving the development of 
having the country linked to their long term energy planning. The description of the electricity 
system has shown that the Spanish FIT scheme functioned relatively well when a take-off of the 
RET sector was required and when it had a small weight in the total electricity generation. 
However, this is no longer the case. The sector today is mature, has strong implications for the 
economy as a whole, and should be seen with huge potential for future growth. 
 
Based on the results of the model, the electricity generated from fossil fuels by 2050 was 
128,000 GWh for the BaU scenario, 177,000 GWh for the FIT scenario, and 115,000 GWh for 
the HFOSPRI scenario. As outlined earlier, it can be concluded that RET have the potential to 
replace fossil fuels by 2050, but the sustainability of this transition will have to be seriously 
addressed and calculated. In particular, the efficiency of RET will have to improved and the 
influence of organizations and corporations in the design and implementation of RET plans will 
have to be reduced. 
 
Although final numbers for investment and premiums for RET were described in this document, 
calculations for final investment and support to RET for the capacity to be installed (90,840MW) 
have not been done due to the need of reviewing the appropriateness of applying those values to 
the result. The cost of installing this capacity will have to be evaluated with different approaches 
and calculations, which it is not covered in this document. 
 
It can also be concluded that with this installed capacity RET will have the potential to reduce 
CO2 emissions by 2050. This reduction will be achieved in the same order that the PER itself 
indicated, which had a rate of 93.6 MtCO2 every five years, if RET were to be installed at the 
same pace.  
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This document attempts to describe how the Spanish electricity system has evolved and can 
evolve with the current measures and policies in what was called the Business as Usual scenario, 
as well as possible ways to achieve a system with more RET in the future. 
 
The suggested additional scenarios have shown different results, especially in the electricity 
generated by 2050. Wind and Solar contributed in a similar way in all three scenarios. The FIT 
incentives, in principle, were supposed to promote RET, but based on the conditions of the 
model, these incentives were probably not very profitable and not enough to push RET more into 
the system, bringing gas and coal as the alternatives. 
 
In order to achieve the RET target suggested in this document, or any other document of its kind, 
reviews of the latest RET plan should be considered in order to understand and learn more from 
the past. In this regard, no matter how ambitious the targets of a plan of any kind can be, no 
policy will be deployed successfully unless fundamental and structural changes happen. 
 
Spain embraced a more ambitious plan for RET. The plan for technologies in terms of installed 
capacities was a stable plan and set targets for decarbonizing the Spanish energy system and the 
economy by providing huge incentives to meet specific targets for installation. 
 
What happened was that targets for installed capacity were met by huge margins, particularly for 
the installation of solar PV, and this was achieved by financial incentives greater than ten times 
what it was planned. Although the electricity generation from RET target was met, it was only by 
adding large costs to the system.  
 
While comparing the overall performance of the overall system the PER created huge inequities 
across technology sectors, wind versus solar, and so on. For a technology like solar, with low 
capacity factors (CF),  its impact on the overall energy mix was insignificant but it came at a 
very large cost driving other more promising options away from achieving its fuller potential 
because tax and financial incentives are so heavily targeted to one technology or another. 
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Based on the comprehensive description of both the designed scenarios and the current data, 
even after all investments, the system is still dependant on fossil fuels and RET have really not 
made any substantial meaningful impact in the Spain electricity system with the cost of 
electricity being one of the most expensive in Europe and with a huge deficit of around 27,000 
million euros (see chapter 4 for more details). 
 
Spain was the world’s second largest producer of wind energy (MIEYT 2013). The success in 
the development of wind power in Spain has been accompanied by the creation of competitive 
companies now active in international technology markets. As a developed country, the design 
and development of the PER in Spain should have never let the lack of information and 
participation to happen. The PER did not have any information and participation mechanisms 
neither any accountability mechanisms. The political responsibilities inherent to this kind of plan 
makes it essential to substantially improve the accountability mechanisms by means of 
establishing official and national debates at parliamentary levels regarding the state, progress and 
future of RET. 
 
Based on the information outlined in this document, future sustainability targets for the Spanish 
energy model should be based on a combination of energy efficiency and savings policies, and 
promotion, development and penetration of RET, with a progressive decarbonisation of the 
supply mix. All these targets should be included in one consistent plan. Linares et al. (2008) 
suggested that the highest priority should be to focus on policies towards the reduction of 
demand, ahead of RET promotion policies and carbon reduction policies. 
 
The new Spanish RET plan 2011-2020 was passed in November, 11th, 2011. On January 27th, 
2012, the new majority conservative Government (elected November 20th, 2012) suspended the 
premiums for new renewable energy projects in an attempt to cut the nation’s tariff deficit. The 
new law put an end to premiums for new wind, solar, cogeneration and waste-incineration 
projects. Existing RET projects that were already approved to receive premiums were not 
affected by the law. 
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The current Government's energy policy seems to be characterized by dismantling RET, by the 
slowdown of RET, by keeping coal subsidy and a lack of encouragement for energy saving, 
Spain has not implemented serious emission reduction policies, but maintained support for the 
consumption of coal and gas, which has increased significantly by the transport of goods by 
road, has encouraged the use of private transport, has increased exponentially high capacity 
routes, and has built homes (of which there are 3.1 million empty) without criterion. 
 
The energy policy in Spain has not really supported RET effectively due to the continuance of 
uncertainty in the regulatory legal framework of the system and its lack of setting regulations in 
the polluting sectors. 
 
Energy is fundamental to the development of the economy and ensuring the social welfare of a 
country. The energy system should be compatible with sustainable development, i.e., respectful 
with the environment, while ensuring a security in supply, and contributing to increasing the 
competitiveness of the economy. With this in mind, Spain has an irrational supply mix that bases 
generation on expensive and low efficient technologies, which is a real problem for a country 
whose industry is intensive in electricity use: automobile, cement or ceramic enterprises. 
 
As stated, the cost of the Spanish system is unsustainable due primarily to the tariff deficit. The 
large electricity generators (the Unesa members) claim to the Government a cumulative amount 
of around 30,000 million euros which represents the tariff deficit. This debt is in the hands of the 
financial sector: 20,000 million is the hands of the Spanish banking sector, and around 10,000 
million euros in the hands of funds and banks in other countries. 
 
In this last decade, the large electricity corporations have grown and increased their political 
power and influence with the various Governments of Spain, power which has also spread to the 
autonomous communities. Former political leaders and Prime ministers have, and still do, belong 
to the Board of Directors of the four big electricity generators. This is known in Spain as the 
“revolving doors” effect, whereas politicians move back and forth from their political 
responsibilities into the large electricity corporation responsibilities. These political influences 
have been reflected in the regulations approved by Governments, which favors its business 
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model. Examples were payments for capacity and availability, or Royal Decrees – law 1/2012 
and 2/2013. 
 
Spain has a surplus of energy and demand has declined due to the economic crisis. Spain is an 
energetic island and due to this surplus of energy, the service is more expensive. What Spain 
produces has to be consumed it the country. The whole electricity system should then be 
restructured. 
 
In recent years, the electricity sector has been treated as a financial sector. The technical and 
security of supply aspects have been forgotten completely. Energy policies in all the countries of 
the world are supported by three well-known principles: security of supply, economic issues and 
environmental issues. In Spain, since 2004, the focus has been on environmental issues, and the 
security of supply and the economic issues seems to have been forgotten. 
 
In this regard, the EU has no competences in the field of energy, although it does have an interest 
to do so. What the EU does do is regulates energy and electricity issues through the Ministries of 
environment, agriculture and competition, although not many countries have followed these 
directives as strongly as Spain. EU members have handed over sovereignty in monetary policy, 
movement of people or services, environment, agricultural policy, etc but have not done so in 
energy. 
 
Unless the Government of Spain decides to have energy and electricity planning as a core 
activity for the development of the country and the future generations, no plan of any kind will 
be effective in achieving its targets, no matter how ambitious these targets are. 
 
8.2. Recommendations 
It has been concluded that RET has the potential to replace the generation of electricity from 
imported fossil fuels in Spain. Therefore, in order to move towards this potential situation for the  
electricity system, some recommendations can be formulated: 
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• The promotion of RET, both in terms of economic support and availability, should be put 
in place again and be strengthened. It has been proved repeatedly (e.g. Menanteau et al.  
2003) that FITs are the most effective instrument in promoting RET development, but 
they should be fine-tuned, first, to reflect the different cost of different sites (levelized 
costs), and second, to reflect the contribution of RET to the value of the technology to the 
system (capacity factors). These two could be accomplished by starting a gradual 
implementation of smart grids and more investment in storage technologies so RET is 
less dependent on their intermittency. 
 
• With the current demand shown in the results from the model, the development of more 
RET alternatives will not be feasible unless the efficiency of the technologies improved 
(through the capacity factors of the RET alternatives). More R&D for the efficiency of 
RET could be considered. 
 
• The description of the electricity system has shown that the electricity prices do not 
include the real cost of electricity. Investigations should be carried out in order to find out 
how to incorporate in the electricity prices the full cost of electricity generation, so real 
prices can reach final consumers. 
 
• Considerations should be made in order to remove from the "electric pool" the nuclear 
and hydroelectric technologies since these technologies are paid the highest cost of all 
combined cycles. 
 
• To investigate how to achieve a higher degree of penetration of RET in sectors such as 
transport and construction (housing). These sectors have suffered a lack of a subsidy 
return system able to stimulate them, in the same way that the electricity generation 
sector had. 
 
• To investigate a quicker development of distributed generation. This type of generation, 
produced on small scale and near demand points, favors the reduction of energy losses in 
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the network and the reduction of the needs of investments in transport and distribution 
infrastructures, as well as environmental benefits. 
 
• To support regulation for self-consumption of clean energy that facilitates that all people 
can exercise, in favorable conditions, their right to produce and consume their own 
energy. 
 
• As described in this document, Spain has invested more than 80,000 million euros in 
RET. After this investment, it is hard to find the value to the system: Spain has more than 
100,000 MW of Power installed, for a peak demand of 43,000MW; the model, at current 
costs and availabilities, does not offer any other alternatives but to continue with fossil 
fuels and with the current renewable energy technologies available. Further investigations 
could be carried out in order to assess the potential of other RET with better capacity 
factors such as geothermal, minihydro, and wind-offshore. In addition, studies could be 
developed in order to start facilitating  new storage and smart grid technologies to support  
RET plans. 
 
• National Governments should be constantly searching for the true value of the systems 
and the consumers. The Government of Spain should make energy a priority for the 
country’s future development. The two largest political parties in Spain should 
collaborate in making this a priority. 
 
• The whole energy structure could be reviewed in depth by the Government of Spain, and 
assess the importance and influence of all the stakeholders in the energy system. 
 
• To investigate hot to put in place a separation between the companies who own the 
transmission networks and electricity distribution and those having the power generation. 
 
• To adapt the Law of incompatibilities in order to put control measures in place to reduce 
or eliminate the controversial influences of people who have held positions of 
118 
responsibility in the public administration and later exercise these influences in their 
positions within the large energy companies and vice versa. 
 
• To provide the experiences of RET plans in Spain to other jurisdictions so they can learn 
from the “Spanish experience”. 
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9. Further work 
Following is a list of suggestions to build on this research: 
 
1. Use the model to study the claims of lobby groups (ie. Nuclear, Renewable, think tanks, 
etc). 
 
2. Look at the demand side of the equation from an “income group” perspective instead of a 
“service group”. 
 
3. Incorporate future new renewable energy technologies in the model for the same time 
horizon. 
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Appendix B – Primary energy additional graphs 
 
Figure B.1 Evolution of primary energy – BaU 
 
 
Figure B.2. Evolution of primary energy – FIT 
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Figure B.3. Evolution of primary energy – HFOSPRI 
 
 
 
Figure B.4. Primary energy share by 2050 – BaU 
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Figure B.5. Primary energy share by 2050 – FIT 
 
 
 
Figure B.6. Primary energy share by 2050 – HFOSPRI 
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Appendix C – Primary energy imports additional graphs 
 
Figure C.1. Evolution of imports on primary energy – BaU 
 
 
Figure C.2. Evolution of imports on primary energy – FIT 
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Figure C.3. Evolution of imports on primary energy – HFOSPRI 
 
 
Figure C.4. Imports share on primary energy by 2050 – BaU 
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Figure C.5. Imports share on primary energy by 2050 – FIT 
 
 
Figure C.6. Imports share on primary energy by 2050 – HFOSPRI 
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Appendix D – Electricity generation additional graphs 
 
Figure D.1. Evolution of electricity generation – BaU 
 
 
Figure D.2. Evolution of electricity generation – FIT 
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Figure D.3. Evolution of electricity generation – HFOSPRI 
 
 
Figure D.4. Electricity generation share by 2050 – BaU 
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Figure D.5. Electricity generation share by 2050 – FIT 
 
 
Figure D.6. Electricity generation share by 2050 – HFOSPRI 
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Appendix E – Electricity generation from fossil additional 
graphs 
 
Figure E.1. Evolution of electricity generation from fossil resources – BaU 
 
 
Figure E.2. Evolution of electricity generation from fossil resources – FIT 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
200000
2005 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2050
G
W
h
Electricity generation from fossil - BaU
Oil
Gas
Coal
Coal CCS
0.00
50,000.00
100,000.00
150,000.00
200,000.00
250,000.00
2005 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2050
G
W
h
Electricity generation from fossil – FIT
Oil
Gas
Coal
151 
 
Figure E.3. Evolution of electricity generation from fossil resources – HFOSPRI 
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Appendix F -  CO2 emissions additional graphs 
 
Figure F.1. Evolution of CO2 emissions before CCS – BaU 
 
 
 
Figure F.2. Evolution of CO2 emissions before CCS – FIT 
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Figure F.3. Evolution of CO2 emissions before CCS – HFOSPRI 
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Appendix G -  VEDA training course agenda 
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Appendix H -  VEDA training course certificate 
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Appendix I – Wind data 
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